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HERE, THERE, AND EVERYWHERE: HUMAN 
DIGNITY IN CONTEMPORARY LAW AND IN 
THE TRANSNATIONAL DISCOURSE 
Luís Roberto Barroso* 
Abstract: Over the past several decades, human dignity has become an 
omnipresent idea in contemporary law. This Article surveys the use of 
human dignity by domestic and international courts and describes the 
concept’s growing role in the transnational discourse, with special atten-
tion paid to the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Article examines 
the legal nature of human dignity, finding it to be a constitutional princi-
ple rather than a freestanding fundamental right, and develops a unifying 
and universal identity for the concept. At its core, human dignity contains 
three elements—intrinsic value, autonomy, and community value—and 
each element has unique legal implications. The Article considers how this 
elemental approach to the analysis of human dignity can assist in structur-
ing legal reasoning and justifying judicial choices in hard cases, such as 
abortion, same-sex marriage, and assisted suicide. 
Introduction 
 In France, Mr. Wackeneim wanted to participate in a show known 
as “dwarf tossing,” in which nightclub patrons would try to heave a 
dwarf the furthest distance possible. In the United Kingdom, Mrs. Ev-
ans, after losing her ovaries, wanted to insert into her uterus embryos 
fertilized with her eggs and semen from her ex-husband. In Italy, the 
family of Mrs. Englaro wanted to suspend medical treatment and let 
her die peacefully after seventeen years in a vegetative coma. In Brazil, 
Mr. Ellwanger wanted to publish books denying the existence of the 
Holocaust. In the United States, Mr. Lawrence wanted to have intimate 
relations with a same-sex partner without being considered a criminal. 
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In Colombia, Mrs. Lais wanted official recognition of her right to work 
as a sex professional. In Germany, Mr. Gründgens wanted to prevent 
the republication of a book based on the life of his father because he 
considered it offensive to his father’s honor. In South Africa, Mrs. 
Grootboom, living in extremely miserable conditions, wanted the state 
to provide shelter for her and her family. In France, the young Mr. Per-
ruche wanted compensation for being born, or rather, for not being 
aborted, because a prenatal diagnostic error left unforeseen the severe 
risk of physical and mental lesions with which he was born.1 
 Each of these scenarios represents real cases decided by high 
courts throughout the world and share one common trait: the meaning 
and scope of the idea of human dignity. In recent decades, human dig-
nity has become one of the Western world’s greatest examples of ethi-
cal consensus, mentioned in countless international documents, na-
tional constitutions, legal statutes, and judicial decisions.2 In theory at 
least, few ideas garner such spirited and unanimous concurrence. In 
practice, however, dignity as a legal concept frequently functions 
merely as a mirror onto which each person projects his or her own val-
ues. It is not by chance that human dignity is invoked throughout the 
world by opposing sides in such matters as abortion, euthanasia, as-
sisted suicide, same-sex marriage, hate speech, cloning, genetic engi-
neering, sex-change operations, prostitution, the decriminalization of 
drugs, the shooting down of hijacked aircrafts, protection against self-
incrimin-ation, the death penalty, life imprisonment, the use of lie de-
tectors, hunger strikes, and the enforcement of social rights. The list is 
endless. 
 In the United States, references to human dignity by the Supreme 
Court trace back to the 1940s.3 The use of the concept in American 
law, however, is episodic and underdeveloped,4 relatively incoherent 
and inconsistent,5 and lacking in sufficient specificity and clarity.6 De-
                                                                                                                      
1 Each of these cases is discussed in turn below. See infra text accompanying notes 44, 
58–59, 323, 356–357, 368, 422–429. 
2 See sources cited infra note 74. 
3 Vickie C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational 
Constitutional Discourse, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 15, 16–17 (2004) (articulating the Supreme 
Court’s early case law development concerning human dignity). 
4 Id. at 17. 
5 See Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 Colum. J. Eur. 
L. 201, 239 (2008). 
6 See Gerald L. Neuman, Human Dignity in United States Constitutional Law, in Zur 
Autonomie des Individuums [On the Autonomy of the Individual] 249, 249–50 (Di-
eter Simon & Manfred Weiss eds., 2000). 
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spite this history, in recent years a clear and noticeable trend emerged 
in which courts employ human dignity in cases involving fundamental 
rights, such as the rights to privacy and equal protection, the preven-
tion of unconstitutional searches and seizures, the prevention of cruel 
and unusual punishment, and the “right to die.”7 Although an array of 
distinguished authors embrace as a qualitative leap the expanded idea 
of human dignity as the foundation for the U.S. Bill of Rights,8 this view 
is not unanimous. In the courts and the Academy, voices such as those 
of Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor James Whitman fiercely dispute 
the role of human dignity in constitutional interpretation and in legal 
reasoning generally, challenging its necessity, convenience, and consti-
tutionality.9 Moreover, some look with distaste, and even horror, at the 
mere possibility of resorting to foreign materials on human dignity to 
establish a shared view of its meaning.10 
 The ideas that follow are based on the assumption that human 
dignity is a valuable concept with growing importance in constitutional 
interpretation, and that it can play a central role in the justification of 
decisions involving morally complex issues. It is past time to consider 
dignity to be a more substantive concept in legal discourse; too often, it 
serves merely as a rhetorical ornament, a vessel of convenience for un-
related cargo. With that in mind, this Article sets out to accomplish 
three main objectives. Part I discusses the importance of the notion of 
human dignity in domestic and international case law, and in the 
transnational discourse.11 I argue that the United States has joined this 
trend, albeit timidly, and that there is no reason why it should not. Part 
                                                                                                                      
7 See, e.g., Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurispru-
dence, 84 Neb. L. Rev. 740, 751, 753, 777, 784 (2006) (surveying the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
application of human dignity in the context of fundamental rights). 
8 See, e.g., Larry Tribe, Larry Tribe on Liberty and Equality, Balkinization (May 28, 
2008), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/05/larry-tribe-on-liberty-and-equality.html (“The 
strategy that for me promises the greatest glimpse of the infinite is a strategy that resists 
rigid compartmentalization and that reaches across the liberty/equality boundary to rec-
ognize the ultimate grounding of both in an expanding idea of human dignity.”); see also 
Izhak Englard, Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel’s Constitutional Framework, 21 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1903, 1917–18 n.74 (2000); Jeremy M. Miller, Dignity as a New Framework, 
Replacing the Right to Privacy, 30 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 1, 3 (2007). 
9 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 983 (1992); James Q. 
Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 Yale L.J. 1151, 1160, 
1221 (2004). 
10 See, e.g., Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, Legal Aff., 
July/Aug. 2004, at 38, 40–42 (claiming that using foreign decisions even in a limited way 
undermines the court system and reduces judicial influence). 
11 By transnational discourse, I mean courts from one country making reference to de-
cisions of courts of a different country. 
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II identifies the legal nature of human dignity— as a fundamental right, 
absolute value, or legal principle—and establishes its minimum con-
tent. This, I argue, is comprised of three elements: the intrinsic value of 
every human being, individual autonomy, and community value. My 
purpose is to determine the legal implications associated with each 
element; for example, the fundamental rights, responsibilities, and du-
ties that they entail. Part III shows how establishing human dignity’s 
legal nature and minimum content can be useful in structuring legal 
reasoning in difficult cases. To confirm my central argument, I use as 
examples the issues of abortion, same-sex marriage, and assisted sui-
cide. 
I. Human Dignity in Contemporary Law 
A. Origin and Evolution 
 In one line of development stretching from classical Rome through 
the Middle Ages and into the advent of the liberal state, dignity— digni-
tas—was a concept associated with either the personal status of some 
individuals or the prominence of certain institutions.12 As for personal 
status, dignity represented the political or social rank derived primarily 
from holding certain public offices, as well as from general recognition 
of personal achievements or moral integrity.13 The term was also used to 
qualify prominent institutions, such as the sovereign, the crown, or the 
state, in reference to the supremacy of their powers.14 In either case, 
dignity entailed a general duty of honor, respect, and deference owed to 
those individuals and institutions worthy of it; it was an obligation whose 
infringement could be sanctioned with criminal and civil remedies.15 
Thus, in Western culture, the first meaning attributed to dignity, as used 
to categorize individuals, presupposed a hierarchical society and was 
linked to a superior status, a higher rank, or position.16 In many ways, 
                                                                                                                      
12 Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 
19 Eur. J. Int’l L. 655, 657 (2008). 
13 Englard, supra note 8, at 1904. 
14 See generally 4 Jean Bodin, Les Six Livres de la République (Christiane Frémont et 
al. eds., Librairie Arthème Fayard 1986) (1593) (describing the elements of a well-ordered 
commonwealth), translated in Book IV: The Rise and Fall of Commonwealths, Constitution. 
org, http://www.constitution.org/bodin/bodin_4.txt (last visited May 15, 2012). 
15 Charlotte Girard & Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez, Introduction to La Dignité de la 
Personne Humaine: Recherche sur un Processus de Juridicisation [Human Dignity: 
Survey on a Judicialization Process] 17, 24 (Charlotte Girard & Stéphanie Hennette-
Vauchez eds., 2005). 
16 Englard, supra note 8, at 1904; McCrudden, supra note 12, at 657. 
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dignity equaled nobility, implying special treatment and distinct rights 
and privileges.17 Based on these premises, it is erroneous to understand 
the contemporary idea of human dignity as a historical development of 
the Roman concept of dignitas hominis. The current notion of human 
dignity did not supersede the old one; rather, it is the product of a dif-
ferent history that ran parallel to the origins discussed above. 
 As currently understood, human dignity relies on the assumption 
that every human being has intrinsic worth.18 Multiple religious and 
philosophical theories and conceptions seek to justify this metaphysical 
view. Beginning with classical thought,19 the long development of the 
contemporary view of human dignity is anchored in the Judeo-
Christian tradition, the Age of Enlightenment, and the aftermath of 
World War II.20 From a religious perspective, the core ideas of human 
dignity are found in the Hebrew Bible: God created mankind in his 
own image and likeness21 and imposed on each person the duty to love 
his neighbor as himself.22 Such concepts are repeated in the Christian 
New Testament.23 As for the philosophical origins of human dignity, Ro-
man statesman Marcus Tullius Cicero was the first author to associate 
the expression “dignity of man” with reason and the capacity for free 
moral decision.24 By 1486, led in part by Pico della Mirandola, the ratio 
philosophica started to depart from its subordination to the ratio theologi-
cal.25 Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria26 and German philoso-
                                                                                                                      
17 See Michael J. Meyer, Dignity as a (Modern) Virtue, in The Concept of Human Dig-
nity in Human Rights Discourse 195, 196 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002) 
(describing “social dignity” as a function of status or rank). 
18 See id. 
19 See Cicero, On Duties 41–42 (M.T. Griffin & E.M. Atkins eds., Margaret Atkins 
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (ca. 44 BCE). 
20 See McCrudden, supra note 12, at 658–63. 
21 See Genesis 1:26–:27. 
22 See Leviticus 19:18. 
23 See, e.g., Matthew 22:39; Ephesians 4:24. Due to its major influence in Western Civiliza-
tion, many authors emphasize the role of Christianity in shaping what came to be identi-
fied as human dignity. See, e.g., Christian Starck, The Religious and Philosophical Background of 
Human Dignity and Its Place in Modern Constitutions, in The Concept of Human Dignity in 
Human Rights Discourse, supra note 17, at 179, 180–81. 
24 See Cicero, supra note 19, at 41–42; Hubert Cancik, “Dignity of Man” and “Persona” 
in Stoic Anthropology: Some Remarks on Cicero, De Officis I 105–107, in The Concept of Hu-
man Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, supra note 17, at 19, 20–21, 27. 
25 Mirandola’s famous speech Oratio de Hominis Dignity (Oration on the Dignity of Man) is 
considered to be the founding manifesto of the humanist Renaissance. See generally Giovanni 
Pico della Mirandola, Oratio de Homnis Digantate (Eugenio Garin ed., Edizioni 
Studio Tesi 1994) (1486). 
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pher Samuel Pufendorf27 made further significant contributions to the 
subject. It was the Enlightenment, however, that brought about the cen-
trality of man, along with individualism, liberalism, the development of 
science, religious tolerance, and the advent of a culture of individual 
rights.28 Only then was the quest for reason, knowledge, and freedom 
able to break through the thick wall of authoritarianism, superstition, 
and ignorance that the manipulation of faith and religion had built 
around medieval societies.29 Immanuel Kant, one of the Enlighten-
ment’s foremost representatives, defined this as “mankind’s exit from 
its self-imposed immaturity.”30 
 In addition to these religious and philosophical landmarks, a strik-
ing historical landmark contributed to the current notion of human 
dignity: the reaction to the horrors of National Socialism and fascism in 
the aftermath of World War II. In the reconstruction of a world morally 
devastated by totalitarianism and genocide, human dignity was incor-
porated into the political discourse of the winners as the grounds for a 
long-awaited era of peace, democracy, and the protection of human 
rights.31 Two main factors imported human dignity into the legal dis-
course. First, express language referring to human dignity was included 
in several international treaties and documents, as well as several na-
tional constitutions.32 Second, a more subtle phenomenon became in-
creasingly visible over time: the rise of a post-positivist legal culture that 
re-approximated law with moral and political philosophy, attenuating 
                                                                                                                      
26 Francisco de Vitoria (1492–1546) was known for his fierce defense of the rights of 
Indians against the colonists in the New World. See Edwin Williamson, The Penguin 
History of Latin America 64–65 (rev. ed. 2009). 
27 Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694) was a precursor to the Enlightenment and a 
pioneer in the secular conception of human dignity, which he founded on moral freedom. 
See generally Samuel Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to 
Natural Law ( James Tully ed., Michael Silverhorne trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) 
(1673). 
28 See McCrudden, supra note 12, at 659–60. 
29 See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment 234 (Fritz C.A. 
Koelln & James P. Pettegrove trans., 1951) (stating that the Enlightenment “oppose[d] the 
power of convention, tradition, and authority” as a means of “removing the rubble of the 
ages in order to make visible the solid foundations of the structure of knowledge”). On the 
Enlightenment generally, see 2 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation 
(1969); Paul Hazard, European Thought in the Eighteenth Century ( J. Lewis May 
trans., 1954). 
30 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?, in What Is 
Enlightenment?: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions 
58, 62–63 (James Schmidt ed. & trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1996) (1784). 
31 See, e.g., U.N. Charter pmbl. 
32 See, e.g., Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] 
[GG][Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I art. 1(1) (Ger.); sources cited infra note 74. 
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the radical separation imposed by pre-World War II legal positivism.33 
Human dignity plays a prominent role in this renovated jurisprudence, 
where social facts and ethical values strongly influence the interpreta-
tion of legal norms. The following is a brief sketch of the religious, phi-
losophical, political, and legal trajectory of human dignity toward its 
contemporary meaning. 
B. Comparative Law, International Law, and the Transnational Discourse 
1. Human Dignity in the Constitutions and Judicial Decisions of 
Different Countries 
 The concept of human dignity is found in most constitutions writ-
ten after World War II.34 It is generally recognized that the rise of hu-
man dignity as a legal concept owes its origins most directly to German 
constitutional law.35 In fact, based on provisions of the German Basic 
Law of 1949, which declare that human dignity shall be “inviolable”36 
and establish a right to the “free development of one’s personality,”37 
the German Constitutional Court (German Court) developed a body of 
law and doctrine that has influenced case law and scholarship through-
                                                                                                                      
33 In Europe, and particularly in Germany, the reaction against positivism started with 
Gustav Radbruch’s article Fünf Minuten Rechtsphilosophie [Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy], 
Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung (Heidelberg, Ger.), Sept. 12, 1945, available at http://www.human 
istische-union.de/wir_ueber_uns/geschichte/geschichtedetail/back/geschichte/article/ 
gustav-radbruch-fuenf-minuten-rechtsphilosophie/. The article was very influential in shap-
ing the jurisprudence of values that enjoyed prestige in the aftermath of the War. In the Anglo-
Saxon tradition, John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) has been regarded as a milestone in 
bringing elements of ethics and political philosophy into jurisprudence. Ronald Dworkin’s 
“general attack on positivism” in his article The Model of Rules, 35 U. Chicago L. Rev. 14 
(1967), is another powerful example of this trend. In Latin America, Carlos Santiago Nino’s 
book The Ethics and Human Rights (1991) is also very representative of the post-positivist cul-
ture. 
34 This includes, among others, the constitutions of Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, 
Spain, South Africa, Brazil, Israel, Hungary and Sweden. Some countries, such as Ireland, 
India, and Canada, reference human dignity in the preambles of their constitutions. See, 
e.g., Neomi Rao, American Dignity and Healthcare Reform, 35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 171, 
171 n.1 (2012). 
35 Dieter Grimm, Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar [Human Dignity Is 
Inviolable] 7 (2010). Dieter Grimm, former justice on the German Constitutional Court, 
delievered this speech at a ceremony celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the Grundge-
setz (Basic Law), on May 8, 2009, at the Stiftung Bundespräsident-Theodor-Heuss-Haus. 
36 Grundgesetz, BGBl. I art. 1(1) (“Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar.”). 
37 Id. art. 2(1) (“Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit 
. . . .”). 
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out the world.38 According to the German Court, human dignity is at 
the very top of the constitutional system, representing a supreme value, 
an absolute good in light of which every provision must be inter-
preted.39 Regarded as the foundation for all basic rights,40 the dignity 
clause has both subjective and objective dimensions, empowering indi-
viduals with certain rights and imposing affirmative obligations on the 
state.41 On various occasions, the German Court emphasizes that the 
image of man in the Basic Law involves a balance between the individ-
ual and the community.42 Based on this understanding of human dig-
nity, the German Court developed a broad and varied case law on many 
difficult subjects, such as: defining the scope of the right of privacy to 
include protection from both state43 and private44 interference; prohib-
iting Holocaust denial;45 prohibiting shooting down aircrafts seized by 
terrorists;46 and declaring it unconstitutional for the state to decrimi-
nalize abortion,47 a decision that was subsequently revised to allow for 
more flexibility in the regulation of abortion.48 
                                                                                                                      
 
38 See Grimm, supra note 35, Part II (discussing the German Constitutional Court’s role 
in shaping the concept of human dignity.). 
39 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] July 16, 1969, 
27 BVerfGE 1 (6) (Ger.) [hereinafter Micro-Census Case]; see also Bundesverfassungs-
gericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 24, 1971, 30 BVerfGE 173 (195–200) 
(Ger.) [hereinafter Mephisto Case] (holding that the human dignity clause in Article 1 of 
the Basic Law trumps Article 5, clause 3, which establishes the freedom of art). This “abso-
lute” character of human dignity has been object of growing dispute, but is still the domi-
nant view in the Court. See Grimm, supra note 35, at 12. 
40 See Mephisto Case, 30 BVerfGE 173 (197). 
41 Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Re-
public of Germany 312 (1997). 
42 See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] July 20, 
1954, 4 BVerfGE 7 (15–16) (Ger.); see also Kommers, supra note 41, at 304–05 (providing 
an English translation of the Court’s statements regarding the interaction between the 
individual and the community). 
43 Micro-Census Case, 27 BVerfGE 1 (4). 
44 Mephisto Case, 30 BVerfGE 173 (195–96). 
45 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 13, 1994, 
90 BVerfGE 241 (246) (Ger.); see also Winfried Brugger, Ban on or Protection of Hate Speech? 
Some Observations Based on German and American Law, 17 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 1, 5–7 (2002). 
46 Bundesverfassungsgeright [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 15, 2006, 15 
BVerfGE 118 (Ger.). 
47 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975, 
39 BVerfGE 1 (2) (Ger.). In this decision, the Court ruled that the right to life and the 
duty of the state to protect that right require the criminalization of abortion. Conse-
quently, the Court declared unconstitutional a law decriminalizing first-trimester abortion. 
For an abridged English translation of this case, see Kommers, supra note 41, at 336–46. 
48 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993, 
88 BVerfGE 203 (208–13) (Ger.). In this decision, the Court reiterated the state’s duty to 
protect the unborn, but admitted that some restrictions on abortion could violate a 
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 In France, it was not until 1994 that the Constitutional Council, 
combining different passages of the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, 
proclaimed that dignity was a principle of constitutional status.49 
French commentators, more or less enthusiastically, refer to human 
dignity as a necessary underlying element to all of French positive law,50 
as both a founding and normative concept,51 and as the philosopher’s 
stone of fundamental rights.52 The principle of human dignity has 
been invoked in a variety of contexts, from the declaration that decent 
housing for everyone is a constitutional value,53 to the validation of 
statutes permitting abortion until the twelfth week of pregnancy.54 
More recently, the Constitutional Council upheld two controversial laws 
enacted by the Parliament: one making it illegal to wear full face veils in 
public, including the Islamic burqa,55 and the other banning same-sex 
marriage.56 Although human dignity is not explicitly referenced in ei-
ther of these decisions, it is clearly implicated to the extent that both 
matters concern religious freedom, equality, and personal existential 
choices. The State Council, in turn, ruled that the bar spectacle known 
as “dwarf tossing” should be prohibited, a decision discussed in Part II 
of this Article.57 In 2000, the Court of Appeals issued an extremely con-
troversial decision in the Perruche Case, recognizing a “right not to be 
                                                                                                                      
woman’s dignity. After the decision, the government enacted a new law, which stated that 
abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy would not be punishable, provided the woman 
had undergone compulsory pro-life counseling. For an abridged English translation of this 
case, see Kommers, supra note 41, at 349–55. 
49 Conseil constitutionnel [CC][Constitutional Court] decision No. 94–343/344DC, 
July 27, 1994, J.O. 11024 (Fr.). 
50 See Jacques Robert, The Principle of Human Dignity, in The Principle of Respect for 
Human Dignity 43, 43 (1999). 
51 Girard & Hennette-Vauchez, supra note 15, at 17. 
52 Dominique Rousseau, Les libertés individuelles et la dignité de la personne 
humaine [Individual Freedom and Human Dignity] 69 (1998). 
53 Conseil constitutionnel [CC][Constitutional Court] decision No. 94–359DC, Jan. 
19, 1995, J.O. 1166 (Fr.). 
54 Conseil constitutionnel [CC][Constitutional Court] decision No. 2001–446DC, June 
27, 2001, J.O. 10828 (Fr.); Conseil constitutionnel [CC][Constitutional Court] decision 
No. 74–54DC, Jan. 15, 1975, J.O. 671 (Fr.) (affirming the constitutionality of the Voluntary 
Interruption of Pregnancy Act). 
55 Conseil constitutionnel [CC][Constitutional Court] decision No. 2010–613DC, Oct. 
7, 2010, J.O. 18345 (Fr.). 
56 See Le Conseil constitutionnel dit non au marriage homosexual, Le Soir (Fr.) ( Jan. 28, 
2011), http://www.lesoir.be/actualite/france/2011–01–28/le-conseil-constitutionnel-dit-non- 
au-mariage-homosexuel-818228.php. 
57 Conseil d’État Assemblee [CE Ass.][Administrative Court Assembly] decision No. 
136727, Oct. 27, 1995, Rec. Lebon (Fr.), available at http:/www.juricaf.org/arret/FRANCE-
CONSEILDETAT-19951027-136727; see infra text accompanying notes 356–3357. 
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born,” and granting a child, represented by his parents, compensation 
for the fact that he was born deaf, dumb, partially blind, and with se-
vere mental deficiencies.58 In another case that gained notoriety, the 
Court of Grand Instance of Créteil recognized Corinne Parpalaix’s 
right to undergo artificial insemination using the sperm of her late 
husband, who had deposited the sperm at a sperm bank prior to un-
dergoing a high-risk surgical procedure.59 
 The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized human dignity as a 
fundamental value underlying both the common law and the 1982 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,60 a value that has a communitarian 
dimension and is accompanied by a number of responsibilities.61 For 
example, the meaning and scope of human dignity was directly or indi-
rectly involved in the opinions that struck down legislation against 
abortion,62 the denial of a right to assisted suicide,63 the validity of 
same-sex marriage,64 and the decriminalization of the use of mari-
juana.65 In Israel, human dignity became an express constitutional con-
cept in 1992.66 Respect for human dignity is at the center of several 
morally charged cases decided by the Israeli Supreme Court, including 
one decision in which the court ruled that it was unacceptable to use 
the prolonged detention of Lebanese prisoners as a bargaining chip to 
obtain the return of Israeli soldiers,67 and another decision that rein-
stated Israel’s absolute prohibition of torture, with no exceptions and 
no room for balancing, even for interrogations of suspected terror-
ists.68 In South Africa, the Constitutional Court utilized human dignity 
                                                                                                                      
58 Cour de cassation [Cass.][Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] ass. plén., Nov. 17, 
2000, Bull. civ., No. 526 (Fr.) (finding against defendant laboratory, which failed to detect 
that the mother had contracted rubella). 
59 T.G.I. Créteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gaz. du Pal. 1984, 2, pan. jurisp., 560. See generally Gail A. 
Katz, Note, Parpalaix c. CECOS: Protecting Intent in Reproductive Technology, 11 Harv. J.L. & 
Tech. 683 (1998). 
60 See R. v. S. (R.J.), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 451, 605 (Can.). 
61 See R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, 676 (Can.). 
62 See R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 164–66, 173–74 (Can.). 
63 See Rodriguez v. B.C. (A.G.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, 521–22 (Can.). 
64 See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, paras. 53–54 (Can.). 
65 See R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, paras. 85–87 (Can.). 
66 In 1992, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was enacted. See Basic Law: Hu-
man Dignity and Liberty, 2754-1994, SH No. 1454 (Isr.), available at http://www.knesset. 
gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. 
67 CrimA 7048/97 Plonim v. Minister of Defense 54(1) PD 721 [2000] (Irs.), available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/97/480/070/a09/97070480.a09.pdf. 
68 HJC 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Israel 53(4) PD 817 [1999] (Isr.), 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/94/000/051/a09/94051000.a09.pdf. 
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to hold the death penalty unconstitutional,69 to permit abortion during 
the first trimester of a pregnancy,70 and to protect homosexual rela-
tions.71 The Constitutional Court of Colombia, diverging from its coun-
terparts in other countries, held that voluntary prostitution is legitimate 
work.72 There is no need to go on reciting examples, for the point is 
clear: Human dignity has become a central and recurrent concept in 
the reasoning of supreme courts and constitutional courts throughout 
the world.73 
2. Human Dignity in International Documents and Case Law 
 Human dignity has also become an ubiquitous idea in interna-
tional law. Indeed, the term is featured prominently in a wide range of 
declarations and treaties, several of which are enforced by international 
courts.74 In fact, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) used the concept 
of human dignity to support its decisions in a variety of cases, holding, 
for example, that neither the human body nor any of its elements con-
stitute patentable inventions,75 and that an employer fails to respect 
human dignity by terminating an employee because of gender reas-
signment surgery.76 A complex discussion of human dignity occurred 
in the Omega Spielhallen case, in which the ECJ decided that human 
                                                                                                                      
69 See S. v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 451 para. 145 (S. Afr.). 
70 See Christian Lawyers Ass’n v. Minister of Health 1998 (4) SA 1113 (CC) at 1123 (S. 
Afr.). 
71 See Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at 64 
paras. 124–26, 69 para. 135 (S. Afr.). 
72 Corte Constitucional [C.C.][Constitutional Court], agosto 13, 2010, Sentencia T-
629/10 (pp. 42, 81–88) (Colom.), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/RE 
LATORIA/2010/T-629–10.htm. 
73 The United States is discussed separately infra Part I.C. 
74 See, e.g., U.N. Charter pmbl.; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
art. 1, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364); Convention on the Rights of the Child pmbl., Nov. 
20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment pmbl., Dec. 10, 1984, 1426 U.N.T.S. 85; African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights pmbl., June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women pmbl., Dec. 
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S 13; American Convention on Human Rights art. 5, July 18, 1978, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 143; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pmbl., Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 1971; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination annex, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); 
Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004, 24 B.U. Int’l L.J. 147, 149–50 (2006) (translated by 
Mohammed Amin Al-Midani & Mathilde Cabanettes). 
75 Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. European Parliament, 2001 E.C.R. I-7149. 
76 Case 13/94, P. v. Cornwall Cnty. Council, 1996 E.C.R. I-2159. 
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dignity may have different meanings and scopes within the domestic 
jurisdictions of the European Union.77 Likewise, the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) often employs human dignity as an impor-
tant element in its interpretation of the 1950 European Convention on 
Human Rights.78 In Tyrer v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR held that sub-
jecting a fifteen-year-old to corporal punishment (“three strokes of the 
birch”) was an assault on his dignity and constituted impermissible 
treatment of the boy as an object in the power of authorities.79 The 
ECtHR also found dignity to be implicated in cases involving the aban-
donment of spousal immunity to the charge of rape,80 the criminal 
prosecution of private homosexual behavior among consenting 
adults,81 and the refusal to allow legal gender reassignment.82 The In-
ter-American Court on Human Rights (IACHR) also cites human dig-
nity in cases involving physical, sexual, and psychological violence 
against inmates in a prison,83 solitary confinement or otherwise inhu-
mane incarceration conditions,84 forced disappearances,85 and extra-
                                                                                                                      
77 Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbür-
germeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. I-9641. The dispute involved the prohibi-
tion of a game supplied by a British company, a “laserdrome” used for simulating acts of 
homicide. Id. at I-9644. A German Court had upheld the decision on grounds that the 
“killing game” was an affront to human dignity. Id. at I-9646. 
78 See, e.g., S.W. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 21066/92, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 363, 402 
(1995); Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 11 (1978). The 
Convention, however, does not expressly incorporate the concept of human dignity in its 
text. Cf. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
10(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
79 See Tyrer, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 11–12. 
80 See S.W., 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 402. 
81 See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40, 60–61 
(1981). 
82 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447, 476–77 
(2002). 
83 Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, ¶¶ 203, 
206, 259 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Nov. 25, 2006), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/ 
casos/articulos/seriec_160_ing.pdf. 
84 See, e.g., Boyce v. Barbados, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Nov. 20, 2007), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/ 
casos/articulos/seriec_169_ing.pdf; Caesar v. Trinidad & Tobago, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, ¶ 50 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Mar. 11, 2005), available at http://www.corteidh. 
or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_123_ing.pdf; Juvenile Reeduc. Inst. v. Paraguay, Pre-
liminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, ¶ 167 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
Sept. 2, 2004), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_112_ 
ing.pdf; Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatamela, Merits, Judgment, ¶ 150 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Nov. 
25, 2000), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_70_ing.pdf. 
85 See, e.g., Velásquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, ¶ 155 (Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. July 29, 1988), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_ 
01_ing.pdf. 
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judicial executions.86 At the end of 2010, the IACHR decided against 
granting amnesty for crimes perpetrated by state agents (murder, tor-
ture, and forced disappearances of persons) during the military dicta-
torship in Brazil.87 
3. Human Dignity in the Transnational Discourse 
 In recent years, constitutional and supreme courts all over the 
world have begun engaging in a growing constitutional dialogue88 in-
volving mutual citation and academic interchange89 in public forums 
like the Venice Commission.90 Two factors contribute to the deepening 
of this dialogue. First, countries that are newcomers to the rule of law 
often draw upon the experience of more seasoned democracies. In the 
past several decades, waves of democratization have spread across the 
world, including Europe in the 1970s (Greece, Portugal, and Spain), 
Latin America in the 1980s (Brazil, Chile, and Argentina), and Eastern 
and Central Europe in the 1990s.91 The U.S. Supreme Court, the Ger-
man Constitutional Court, and other similar national courts serve as 
significant role models for these new democracies.92 Even though the 
flow of ideas is primarily one directional, it is, as with any other ex-
change, a two-way street. 
                                                                                                                      
86 See, e.g., Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Repa-
rations and Costs, Judgment, ¶ 216 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. May 26, 2006), available at http:// 
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_213_ing.pdf. 
87 Lund v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
¶ 325 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Nov. 24, 2010), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/ 
articulos/seriec_219_ing.pdf. 
88 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 70 (2004). 
89 Former foreign court justices, such as Aaron Barak from the Supreme Court of Israel 
and Dieter Grimm from the Constitutional Court of Germany, are frequent visitors at Ameri-
can law schools, including Yale and Harvard. See Mark Tushnet, A Court Divided: The 
Rehnquist Court and the Future of Constitutional Law 176 (2005). At Yale Law 
School, the Global Constitutionalism Seminar, directed by Robert Post, brings together a group 
of about fifteen Supreme Court and Constitutional Court judges from around the world. See 
Global Constitutionalism Seminar, Yale L. Sch., http://www.law.yale.edu/intellectuallife/global 
constitutionalismseminar.htm (last visited May 15, 2012). 
90 According to its website, the European Commission for Democracy Through Law, 
known as the Venice Commission, is an advisory body to the Council of Europe and a think-
tank on constitutional law. See Venice Commission, Council of Eur., http://www.venice.coe. 
int/site/main/Presentation_E.asp (last visited May. 15, 2012). 
91 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century 21–24 (1991). 
92 See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 88, at 70–71; Tom Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutional-
ism? The Emergence of Constitutional Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27 Law & Soc. Inquiry 763, 
777 (2002). 
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 The second factor involves the sharing of experiences among 
more mature and traditional democracies. Highly complex and plural 
societies face common challenges in areas ranging from national secu-
rity to racial, religious, and sexual matters.93 Foreign decisions may of-
fer new information and perspectives, and can help build consensus.94 
This appears to be the case with the death penalty—with the exception 
of the United States95—and, to some extent, abortion—similar laws 
exist in the United States, Germany, France, and Canada, among oth-
ers.96 It goes without saying that foreign and international decisions are 
persuasive, but not binding, authorities. This fact alone should be suffi-
cient to set aside any parochial fears. 
 It is not difficult to find examples of this dialogue between the 
courts of different countries. The Supreme Court of Canada, for exam-
ple, frequently cites foreign and international courts’ conceptions of 
dignity. In Kindler v. Canada, the dissenting justices cited abolition of the 
death penalty in the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania.97 In R. v. Morgentaler, the court 
referenced decisions of the German Constitutional Court and the U.S. 
Supreme Court on abortion.98 In R. v. Smith, the dissent cited a number 
of U.S. Supreme Court cases on cruel and unusual punishment.99 In R. 
v. Keegstra, a case upholding the prohibition of hate speech, the Su-
preme Court of Canada cited several related pronouncements by the 
European Commission of Human Rights.100 The Canadian Supreme 
Court’s decision in Rodriguez v. British Columbia, in which it failed to rec-
ognize a right to assisted suicide,101 was cited by the ECtHR in Pretty v. 
United Kingdom, which addressed the same issue.102 The Supreme Court 
of India often cites U.S. Supreme Court decisions in a variety of con-
texts. In one case, the American doctrine of prospective overruling was 
                                                                                                                      
93 See Slaughter, supra note 88, at 119–20. 
94 Id. at 77, 78. 
95 See id. at 66. 
96 See, e.g., Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 46 (striking down provisions of the Criminal 
Code that prohibited abortion). 
97 See [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 806–07 (Can.) (Cory, J., dissenting) (allowing the extradi-
tion of an American capital murder defendant). 
98 See [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 46 (striking down provisions of the Criminal Code that prohib-
ited abortion). 
99 R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, 1092–94 (Can.) (McIntyre, J., dissenting) (holding 
that a minimum mandatory prison term provided for by the Narcotic Control Act failed 
the proportionality test and constituted cruel and unusual punishment). 
100 See [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 753–54, 820 (Can.). 
101 See generally [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.). 
102 Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, para. 23 (2002). 
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the object of intense debate.103 In another judgment, the Indian Court 
applied the American standard of heightened scrutiny for gender dis-
crimination and included a lengthy quote from an opinion authored by 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.104 In South Africa, the Constitutional 
Court cited decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada in cases in-
volving women’s rights to equality,105 as well as cases involving capital 
punishment.106 In an abortion opinion by the Polish Supreme Court, 
Judge Lech Garlicki, writing in dissent, cited opinions by the Spanish 
and German Constitutional Courts.107 
 In the United States, however, references to foreign law and foreign 
decisions are relatively scarce.108 By the end of the twentieth century, 
observers diagnosed a certain isolation and parochialism in the lawyers 
and courts of the United States.109 At the turn of the century, however, a 
new wind started to blow, with foreign precedents cited in opinions by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in cases such as Knight v. Florida,110 Atkins v. Vir-
ginia,111 and Grutter v. Bollinger.112 The landmark decision, however, 
came in 2003 with Lawrence v. Texas, in which Justice Anthony Kennedy, 
                                                                                                                      
103 See Golak Nath v. Punjab, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762, 921–25 (India), available at http:// 
www.liiofindia.org/in/cases/cen/INSC/1967/45.html. 
104 Anuj Garg & Ors v. Hotel Ass’n of India, (2007) 12 S.C.R. 991, 1016 (India), avail-
able at http://www.liiofindia.org/in/cases/cen/INSC/2007/1226.html. 
105 See S. v. Jordan 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at 41 para. 68 (S. Afr.). 
106 Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA at 423 para. 60. 
107 Trybunal Konstytucyjny 28.5.1997 [Decision of the Constitutional Tribunal of May 
28, 1997], K 26/96 (Pol.). 
108 On this matter, see generally Slaughter, supra note 88; and Diane Marie Amann, 
“Raise the Flag and Let It Talk”: On the Use of External Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 2 
Int’l J. Const. L. 597 (2004) (analyzing the U.S. Supreme Court’s changing use of for-
eign legal materials). For some precedent on citing foreign law, see, for example, Miranda 
v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436, 486–90 (1966); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 651–52 (1952) ( Jackson, J., concurring); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 126 n.27 
(1942); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31–32 & n.1 (1905). 
109 See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 Va. L. Rev. 771, 772–73 
(“[T]he global transformation has not yet had the slightest impact on American constitu-
tional thought. The typical American judge would not think of learning from an opinion by 
the German or French constitutional court. Nor would the typical scholar—assuming, 
contrary to fact, that she could follow the natives’ reasoning in their alien tongues. If any-
thing, American practice and theory have moved in the direction of emphatic provincial-
ism.” (footnote omitted)). 
110 528 U.S. 990 (1999). In a dissent from the denial of certiorari, Justice Breyer cited 
cases from India, Zimbabwe, Canada, South Africa, and the European Court of Human 
Rights. See id. at 995–96 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
111 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, asserted that “within 
the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by men-
tally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.” Id. at 316 n.21. 
112 539 U.S. 306 (2003). In her separate opinion, Justice Ginsburg cited two interna-
tional conventions on discrimination. See id. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
346 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 35:331 
writing for the majority, cited a decision of the ECtHR.113 This reference 
prompted a harsh dissent by Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas.114 In 2005, in Roper v. 
Simmons, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, once again cited in-
ternational and foreign law as it pertained to the “international opinion 
against the juvenile death penalty,” adding that “[t]he opinion of the 
world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide re-
spected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”115 In 
their confirmation hearings, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice 
Samuel Alito expressed disapproval of such references.116 Legislative 
threats to ban the use of foreign legal authorities and even to make it an 
impeachable offense did not gain momentum.117 It is therefore clear 
that two different approaches “uncomfortably coexist”118 within the U.S. 
Supreme Court: the “nationalist jurisprudence” view that rejects any ref-
erence to foreign and international precedents, and the “transnational-
ist jurisprudence” view that allows such references.119 The latter ap-
proach, which is more cosmopolitan, progressive, and “venerable,”120 
should prevail. 
C. Human Dignity in the United States 
 Although there is no express reference to human dignity in the 
text of the U.S. Constitution,121 the Supreme Court has long employed 
                                                                                                                      
 
113 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (citing Dudgeon, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 40). 
114 See id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s discussion of these foreign views 
. . . is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since ‘this Court . . . should 
not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.’” (quoting Foster v. Florida, 
537 US. 990, 990 n. (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari))). 
115 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
116 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the 
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 200–01 (2005) (statement of 
John G. Roberts, Jr., nominee); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. 
to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 109th Cong. 370–71, 410, 471 (2006) (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., nominee). 
117 See Charles Lane, Scalia Tells Congress to Mind Its Own Business, Wash. Post, May 19, 
2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/18/ 
AR2006051801961.html. 
118 Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 43, 52–
53 (2004). 
119 Id. at 52. 
120 Id. 
121 Cf. U.S. Const. Among the states, the Montana Constitution has an explicit human 
dignity clause. Article II, section 4 provides: “Individual Dignity. The dignity of the human 
being is inviolable . . . .” Mont. Const. art. II, § 4; see Jackson, supra note 3, at 28 (noting 
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the idea.122 It was not until the 1940s,123 however, and particularly after 
1950,124 that the concept began to gain traction in American constitu-
tional jurisprudence. Some authors associate this with the presence on 
the Court of Justice William Brennan and his view of human dignity as 
a basic value, a constitutional principle, and a source of individual 
rights and liberties.125 As seen in the case law discussed below, the Jus-
tices have never considered human dignity to be a stand-alone or 
autonomous fundamental right, but rather a value underlying express 
and unenumerated rights—such as the rights to privacy, equal protec-
tion, economic assistance from the government, dignity at the end of 
life, as well as protection from self-incrimination, cruel and unusual 
punishment, and unreasonable searches and seizures.126 Human dig-
nity concerns also surface when freedom of expression clashes with re-
putational issues.127 Thus, the role of human dignity has mostly been to 
inform the interpretation of particular constitutional rights.128 
 It is within the context of the right to privacy that human dignity 
arguably plays its most prominent role. It is true that dignity was not 
expressly invoked in the early landmark cases, such as Griswold v. Con-
necticut129 and Roe v. Wade.130 Yet, the core ideas underlying human dig-
                                                                                                                      
 
that the clause has played a secondary role to the next sentence of Article II, section 4, 
which secures equal protection). 
122 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62 (1947) (Frankfurter J., concurring); 
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 632 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 455 (1793). 
123 Justice Murphy used the term “dignity” in his dissents in the following cases: In re 
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 
91, 135 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 240 
(1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
124 The first appearance of the expression “human dignity” in a majority opinion of 
the Supreme Court was in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952). Jackson, supra 
note 3, at 16 n.7. 
125 See, e.g., Seth Stern & Stephen Wermiel, Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion 
409–33 (2010) (explaining Justice Brennan’s objection to the death penalty on the ground 
that it violates basic principles of human dignity); Stephen J. Wermiel, Law and Human 
Dignity: The Judicial Soul of Justice Brennan, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 223, 228, 233, 235 
(1998). 
126 See infra text accompanying notes 130–156. 
127 See Goodman, supra note 7, at 757 (identifying eight categories of cases in which 
the Supreme Court has expressly related human dignity to specific constitutional claims, 
sometimes grounding its decisions in the need to advance human dignity, and sometimes 
rejecting it as a prevailing argument). 
128 Neuman, supra note 6, at 271. 
129 Cf. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a law that prohibited the use of contracep-
tives by married couples). This decision created a new fundamental right—the right of 
privacy—emanating from the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights that protect marital rela-
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nity—autonomy and the freedom to make personal choices—were cen-
tral to these decisions.131 In a subsequent abortion case, Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,132 human dignity was explicitly 
mentioned in both the plurality opinion133 and the dissent.134 The 
same occurred in Stenberg v. Carhart, another abortion decision.135 In 
Lawrence, however, human dignity played its most important role in a 
ruling in which the Court held that the right to privacy prohibits the 
criminalization of consensual intimate relations among same-sex part-
n .ers
ing with sex discrimination expressly reference the concept.139 The 
136 
 In the equal protection context, with regard to women’s rights, 
landmark cases such as Reed v. Reed 137 and Frontiero v. Richardson138 did 
not mention human dignity in their rationales, but other opinions deal-
                                                                                                                      
tions from state intrusions. See id. at 482–85. According to this Article, human dignity is the 
true
he right of a woman to have an abortion in the 
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r” and that dignity is a better term 
for 








edy invoked human dignity in several passages of his 
opin
aw granting males prefer-
enc
s, while female military personnel could 
not
 
 source of non-enumerated fundamental rights. 
130 Cf. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (securing t
 and second trimesters of pregnancy). 
131 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 168; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485, 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
Some authors even contend that privacy is a “misnome
the right at issue. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 8, at 4. 
132 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (overr
erning the right to abortion). 
133 Id. at 851 (“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a per-
son may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central 
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” (emphasis added)). Human dig-
nity was also mentioned in Justice Stevens’ separate opinion. See id. at 916 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part). In Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), anothe
rtion decision, Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, also cited the concept of dignity. 
134 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 983 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting 
in part). Justice Scalia cites several instances in which his peers mentioned the word dig-
nity, along with other concepts (such as autonomy and bodily integrity), to conclude that 
“the best the Court can do to explain how it is that the word ‘liberty’ must be thought to 
include the right to destroy human fetuses is to rattle off a collecti
ply decorate a value judgment and conceal a political choice.” Id. 
135 See 530 U.S. at 920; see also id. at 962 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Notably, while the 
Court in this case struck down a restriction on certain types of abortions, see id. at 946 (ma-
jority opinion), the Court upheld a similar restriction in a subsequent decision, thou
 not explicitly overrule Stenberg, see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 153 (2007). 
136 See 539 U.S. at 558 (securing the right to sexual intimacy for same-sex couples). 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kenn
ion. See id. at 558, 567, 574, 577. 
137 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (declaring unconstitutional a state l
e over females in the appointment of estate administrators). 
138 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (finding unconstitutional rules allowing male members of the 
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idea of human dignity, however, became more important in the context 
of racial discrimination. In Brown v. Board of Education, although the 
Court’s opinion did not expressly refer to human dignity, it is properly 
recognized that the concept clearly underlies the unanimous opinion 
against school segregation.140 In subsequent cases, majority opinions 
expressly reference dignity in relation to racial discrimination.141 
                                                                                                                     
 In cases involving the privilege against self-incrimination, the Su-
preme Court held, in Miranda v. Arizona for example, that the interro-
gation environment, even absent physical intimidation, is “destructive 
of human dignity.”142 Despite this holding, human dignity gradually lost 
its thrust in Fifth Amendment cases.143 With regard to protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, Rochin v. California estab-
lished a direct connection between human dignity and the procedure 
by which evidence is obtained.144 Following the commencement of the 
“war on drugs” in the 1980s, however, human dignity’s fate in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence became gloomier.145 In relation to protec-
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tion against cruel and unusual punishment, and particularly regarding 
the death penalty, the Court declared in Furman v. Georgia that capital 
punishment, as applied in some states—randomly, with unguided dis-
cretion for juries and, as noted in a concurrence by Justice William 
Douglas, with disproportionate impact on minorities146—was cruel and 
unusual punishment.147 Four years later, however, in Gregg v. Georgia, 
the Court upheld Georgia’s redesigned death penalty statute.148 That 
said, dignity was expressly invoked in Atkins149 and Roper,150 in which 
the Court struck down as unconstitutional the execution of mentally 
retarded individuals and offenders under the age of eighteen, respec-
tively.151 
 In death with dignity cases, Justice Brennan referred to human 
dignity in his dissent in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 
in which the Court affirmed a decision that refused to allow the with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment for a woman who had been in a 
vegetative coma for many years.152 In the years that followed, the Court 
denied the existence of a right to physician-assisted suicide in Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg153 and Vacco v. Quill.154 As for claims involving social 
and welfare rights, the closest the Court has come to understanding the 
Constitution as creating positive entitlements is arguably Goldberg v. 
Kelly, in which the Court held that welfare recipients could not have 
their benefits terminated without fair hearings.155 Finally, in the Court’s 
case law, reputational interests are traditionally outweighed by First 
Amendment protection in conflicts between the freedom of expression 
and the opposing right of an individual to protect his image, the latter 
of which the Court does not recognize as constitutionally protected.156 
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D. Arguments Against the Use of Human Dignity as a Legal Concept 
 Opponents of the use of human dignity in law, if not its use alto-
gether, utilize three basic arguments. The first argument is formal in 
nature: When human dignity is not in the text of a state’s constitu-
tion—as is the case in the United States and France—it cannot be used 
in legal reasoning.157 Faithful to textualism as his philosophy of consti-
tutional interpretation,158 this is the point of view advocated by Justice 
Scalia.159 The second argument is more ideological: Human dignity 
should not be used in legal discourse in countries where it is not rooted 
in the legal tradition.160 This is the view, for example, of Neomi Rao, 
for whom human dignity is linked to European communitarian values 
that could weaken American constitutionalism, which is based on indi-
vidual rights.161 Likewise, James Whitman argues that privacy law in 
America is linked to the value of liberty, while in Europe it is oriented 
toward dignity, understood as personal honor.162 Whitman makes two 
highly controversial assertions in connection with his argument. First, 
he links the idea of dignity in Europe with “the star of fascism”163 and 
“Nazi history.”164 Then, in his conclusion, he declares that “[t]he pros-
pects for the kind of dignitary protections embodied in a law of gay 
marriage, we could say, are remote” and that “protecting people’s dig-
nity is quite alien to the American tradition.”165 The third argument 
against the use of dignity as a legal concept is that human dignity lacks 
specific and substantive meaning.166 In a frequently cited editorial, 
Ruth Macklin writes that dignity is a “useless concept” and a “vague re-
statement” of existing notions.167 Along the same lines, Steven Pinker 
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claims that the concept of dignity “remains a mess” and serves a Catho-
lic agenda of “obstructionist ethics.”168 
                                                                                                                     
 While these three arguments have merit, each argument can be 
countered and overcome. As for the textualist objection, it suffices to 
remember that all constitutions bear values and ideas that inspire and 
underlie their provisions without express textual inclusion. In the U.S. 
Constitution, for example, there is no mention of democracy, the rule 
of law, or judicial review; nevertheless, these are omnipresent concepts 
in American jurisprudence and case law. The same holds true for hu-
man dignity, which is a fundamental value that nourishes the content of 
different written norms, while simultaneously informing the interpreta-
tion of the Constitution generally, especially when fundamental rights 
are involved.169 Significant evidence of this argument lies within the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the first binding interna-
tional treaty approved after the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.170 Despite the fact that it does not explicitly reference “human 
dignity,” the treaty’s organs, notably the ECtHR, utilize the concept in 
many decisions, as described above.171 
 The political and philosophical objections to the use of human 
dignity are also rebuttable. Constitutional democracies everywhere 
strive to achieve a balance between individual rights and communi-
tarian values. Even though the political process must set the boundaries 
of these (sometimes) competing spheres—that is, the weight of one or 
the other may vary to some extent—concerns about human dignity ex-
ist on both sides of the scale. For example, human dignity implicates 
both freedom of expression and compulsory vaccination.172 Further, 
there is a fundamental problem with Whitman’s views. He does not 
make a clear and proper distinction between dignity’s ancient connota-
tion—rank, status, and personal honor—and its contemporary mean-
ing which is based on the objective intrinsic value of the individual, as 
well as subjective elements such as personal autonomy.173 This might 
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explain why he links dignity to fascism and National Socialism—and 
their notions of personal honor—rather than the broad and generous 
conception of human rights that developed after the end of the World 
War II as a reaction to the abuses perpetrated by the Axis powers.174 
Another consequence of disregarding the necessary distinction be-
tween human dignity’s ancient and current meanings is apparent in the 
opposition Whitman sees between privacy as liberty and privacy as dig-
nity (that is, as “personal honor”).175 As I set out to demonstrate, dig-
nity is part of the core content of both liberty and privacy, not a con-
cept (much less a right) that can be contradictory to either. Lastly, 
prospects for same-sex marriage seem at this point less dim than Whit-
man anticipated.176 
 Finally, dignity has been condemned as a vague slogan, which can 
be co-opted by authoritarianism and paternalism.177 As with any other 
high-profile, abstract term—such as the right to the free development of 
one’s personality in German constitutional law178 or the Due Process 
and Equal Protection clauses in the American constitution179—there are 
risks involved in the construction of a definition of human dignity. Any 
complex idea, in fact, is subject to abuse or misuse: Democracy can be 
manipulated by populists, federalism can degenerate into hegemony of 
the central government, and judicial review can be contaminated by 
politics. As Ronald Dworkin writes, “[I]t would be a shame to surrender 
an important idea or even a familiar name to this corruption.”180 Thus, 
human dignity, no less than numerous other crucial concepts, needs 
high quality scholarship, public debate, overlapping consensus, ac-
countable governments, and prudent courts. The task is to find a mini-
mum content for human dignity that warrants its use as a meaningful 
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and consequential concept, compatible with free will, democracy, and 
secular values. 
II. The Legal Nature and Minimum Content of Human Dignity 
A. Human Dignity as a Legal Principle 
 Human dignity is a multi-faceted concept utilized in religion, phi-
losophy, politics, and law. There is a reasonable consensus that it consti-
tutes a fundamental value that underlies constitutional democracies 
generally, even when not expressly written in constitutions.181 In Ger-
many, the dominant view is that human dignity is an absolute value that 
prevails in any circumstance.182 This assertion, however, has been per-
tinently challenged over the years.183 As a general rule, law is not a 
space for absolutes. Even if it is reasonable to assert that human dignity 
usually prevails, there are unavoidable situations in which it will be at 
least partially defeated.184 An obvious example is the case of an individ-
ual who, after due process of law, is convicted and sent to prison: An 
important part of his or her dignity—entrenched in the freedom of 
movement—is affected. There is a clear sacrifice of one aspect of dig-
nity in favor of another value. Human dignity, then, is a fundamental 
value, but it should not be regarded as an absolute. Values, either moral 
or political, enter the world of law commonly assuming the form of a 
principle.185 Although constitutional principles and rights frequently 
overlap, this is not the case here. As demonstrated below, the best way 
of categorizing human dignity is not as an autonomous right, but in-
stead as a legal principle with constitutional status. 
 As a fundamental value and a constitutional principle, human dig-
nity serves both as a moral justification for and a normative foundation 
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of fundamental rights.186 It is not necessary to elaborate in more depth 
and detail on the qualitative distinction between principles and rules. 
The conception adopted here is the dominant one in legal theory, 
based on Ronald Dworkin’s seminal writings on the subject187 and fur-
ther developed by the German legal philosopher Robert Alexy.188 Ac-
cording to Dworkin, principles are standards that contain “require-
ment[s] of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality.”189 
Unlike rules, they are not applicable in “an all-or-nothing fashion,”190 
and in certain circumstances they may not prevail due to the existence 
of other reasons or principles that argue in a different direction.191 
Principles have a “dimension of weight,” and when they intersect, it will 
be necessary to consider the specific importance of each principle in 
the specific context.192 For Alexy, principles are “optimization require-
ments”193 whose enforcement will vary in degree according to what is 
factually and legally possible.194 Thus, under Alexy’s theory, principles 
are subject to balancing and to proportionality, and, depending on 
context, they may give way to opposing elements.195 These views are not 
immune to controversies,196 but such a discussion is outside the scope 
of this Article. My predicament is that legal principles are norms that 
have more or less weight in different circumstances. In any case, prin-
ciples provide arguments that must be considered by courts, and each 
principle requires a good faith commitment to its realization, to the 
extent such realization is possible.197 
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 Constitutional principles have different roles in the legal system, 
and at the moment of their concrete application they always generate 
rules that will govern specific situations. To distinguish the two main 
roles, one should think of a principle as two concentric circles.198 The 
inner circle, closer to the center, bears the principle’s core meaning and 
is a direct source of rights and duties.199 For example, the core meaning 
of human dignity requires a ban on torture, even in a legal system with 
no particular rules prohibiting such conduct.200 Of course, when a more 
specific rule already exists—meaning that the framers or the legislature 
detailed the principle in a more concrete fashion—there is no need to 
resort to the more abstract principle of human dignity. To take another 
example, consider countries where the right to privacy is not expressly 
stated in the constitution—as in the United States—or the general right 
against self-incrimination is not explicit—as in Brazil— where these 
rights can be harvested from the core meaning of dignity.201 This is the 
first role of a principle like human dignity: to be a source of rights—
and, consequently, duties—including non-enumerated rights that are 
recognized as part of a mature democratic society. 
 The other major role played by the principle of human dignity is 
interpretive.202 Human dignity is part of the core content of fundamen-
tal rights, such as equality, freedom, or privacy.203 Therefore, it neces-
sarily informs the interpretation of such constitutional rights, helping 
to define their meaning in particular cases. Furthermore, in cases in-
volving gaps in the legal system, ambiguities in the law, the intersection 
between constitutional rights, and tensions between rights and collec-
tive goals, human dignity can be a good compass in the search for the 
best solution. Moreover, in its most basic application, any statute found 
to violate human dignity, on its face or as applied, would be void.204 
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Consistent with my assertion that human dignity is not an absolute 
value, it is also true that human dignity is not an absolute principle ei-
ther. Indeed, if a constitutional principle underlies both a fundamental 
right and a collective goal,205 and if rights collide against themselves or 
with collective goals, a logical deadlock occurs. A shock of absolutes is 
insolvable. What can be said is that human dignity, as a fundamental 
value and principle, should take precedence in most, but not all, situa-
tions. Furthermore, when true (not just rhetorical) aspects of human 
dignity are present on both sides of the argument, the discussion be-
comes more complex. In such circumstances, cultural and political 
background may affect a court’s choice of reasoning—a good example 
being the clash between privacy (in the sense of reputation) and free-
dom of the press.206 
 Finally, a few words on why human dignity should not be charac-
terized as a freestanding constitutional right. It is true that principles 
and rights are closely linked concepts.207 Both constitutional principles 
and constitutional rights represent an opening of the legal system to 
the system of morality.208 It would be contradictory to make human 
dignity a right in its own, however, because it is regarded as the founda-
tion for all truly fundamental rights and the source of at least part of 
their core content.209 Furthermore, if human dignity were to be con-
sidered a constitutional right in itself, it would need to be balanced 
against other constitutional rights, placing it in a weaker position than 
if it were to be used as an external parameter for permissible solutions 
when rights clash. As a constitutional principle, however, human dig-
nity may need to be balanced against other principles or collective 
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goals.210 Again, it should usually prevail, but that will not always be the 
case. It is better to recognize this fact than attempt to deny it with circu-
lar arguments.211 
B. The Influence of Kantian Thought 
 Immanuel Kant, one of the most influential philosophers of the 
Enlightenment, is a central figure in contemporary Western moral and 
legal philosophy. Many of his reflections are directly connected with the 
idea of human dignity, and it is not surprising that he is one of the most 
frequently cited authors in works on the subject.212 Notwithstanding 
the occasional challenges to his system of morality,213 Kantian ethics 
have become a crucial part of the grammar and semantics of the study 
of human dignity.214 For this reason, though at the risk of oversimplifi-
cation, I sketch below three of his central concepts: the categorical im-
perative, autonomy, and dignity.215 
 According to Kant, ethics is the realm of moral law, comprised of 
commands that govern the will in conformity with reason.216 Such 
commands are called imperatives, which are either hypothetical or 
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categorical. A hypothetical imperative identifies the action that is good as 
the means to achieve an end.217 The categorical imperative corresponds 
to an action that is good in itself, regardless of whether it serves a de-
terminate end.218 It is a standard of rationality and represents what is 
objectively necessary in a will that conforms itself to reason.219 Kant 
enunciated this categorical imperative, or imperative of morality, in a 
synthetic and famous proposition: “[A]ct only in accordance with that 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a 
universal law.”220 Note that instead of presenting a catalogue of specific 
virtues, a list of “do’s and don’ts,” Kant conceived a formula of deter-
mining ethical action.221 Another formulation of the categorical im-
perative is the following: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your 
own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an 
end, never merely as a means.”222 
 Autonomy is the property of a will that is free.223 It identifies the 
individual’s capacity for self-determination, in accordance with the rep-
resentation of certain laws, and it is a self-governing reason.224 The core 
idea is that individuals are subject only to the laws they give them-
selves.225 An autonomous person is one bound by his or her own will 
and not by the will of someone else.226 According to Kant, free will is 
governed by reason, and reason is the proper representation of moral 
laws.227 
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 Dignity, in the Kantian view, is grounded in autonomy.228 Where all 
rational beings act according to the categorical imperative, for example 
as lawgivers in the “kingdom of ends” whose maxims could become uni-
versal law, “everything has either a price or a dignity.”229 Things that have 
a price can be replaced by other equivalent things.230 Something that is 
priceless, and that cannot be replaced by another equivalent item, how-
ever, has dignity.231 Such is the unique nature of the human being. Con-
densed into a set of propositions, the essence of Kantian thought re-
garding our subject is as follows: Moral conduct consists of acting 
according to a maxim that one could will to become universal law; every 
person is an end in him- or herself and shall not be instrumentalized by 
other people’s will; human beings have no price and cannot be replaced 
because they are endowed with an absolute inner worth called dignity. 
C. The Minimum Content of the Idea of Human Dignity 
 It is not easy to elaborate a transnational concept of human dignity 
that properly takes into account the varied political, historical, and reli-
gious circumstances that are present in different countries. For this 
purpose, one must settle for an open-ended, plastic, and plural notion 
of human dignity. Roughly stated, human dignity, in my minimalist 
conception, identifies (1) the intrinsic value of all human beings, as 
well as (2) the autonomy of every individual, (3) limited by some le-
gitimate constraints imposed upon such autonomy on behalf of social 
values or state interests (community value). I analyze these three ele-
ments based on a philosophical perspective that is secular, neutral, and 
universalist. Secularism232 means that church and state must be separate, 
that religion is a matter private to each individual, and that a humanist 
rational view must prevail over religious conceptions in political and 
public affairs.233 Neutrality is a central concept in contemporary liberal 
thought, commanding that the state must not take sides when different 
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233 This view, of course, does not affect freedom of religion, and religious belief is in-
deed a legitimate option for millions of people. See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age 3 
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reasonable conceptions of the good life are in question.234 These no-
tions of secularism and neutrality represent an effort to free human 
dignity from any comprehensive religious or political doctrine, incor-
porating it into the idea of public reason, insightfully developed by John 
Rawls.235 
 Finally, a few words on universalism and its companion idea, multi-
culturalism. Multiculturalism denotes respect and appreciation for eth-
nic, religious, or cultural diversity.236 Since the late twentieth century, it 
has become widely accepted that multiculturalism is based on values 
that are not only consistent with but also required by liberal democra-
cies.237 Minorities have a right to their identities and differences, as well 
as the right to be recognized.238 Further, human dignity no doubt sup-
ports such views. Human dignity, at its core, however, also possesses a 
universalist ambition, representing the fabric that binds together the 
human family.239 Some degree of enlightened idealism is necessary in 
this domain in order to confront entrenched practices and customs of 
violence, sexual oppression, and tyranny. To be sure, this is a battle of 
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ideas to be won with patience and perseverance. Troops will not do 
it.240 
 Before moving on, I will restate a previous comment in a slightly 
more analytic fashion. Human dignity and human (or fundamental) 
rights are closely connected, like the two sides of a coin—or to use a 
common image, the two faces of Janus.241 One is turned toward phi-
losophy, reflecting the moral values by which every person is unique and 
deserves equal respect and concern;242 the other is turned toward law, 
reflecting individual rights.243 This represents morality in the form of 
law or, as Jürgen Habermas states, a “fusion of moral contents with coer-
cive law.”244 For this reason, in the following sections I will break down 
each element within the core meaning of human dignity, identifying its 
moral content and legal implications with respect to individual rights. 
1. Intrinsic Value 
 Intrinsic value is, on a philosophical level, the ontological element 
of human dignity linked to the nature of being.245 The uniqueness of 
human kind is the product of a combination of inherent traits and fea-
tures—including intelligence, sensibility, and the ability to communi-
cate—that give humans a special status in the world, distinct from other 
species.246 Intrinsic value is the opposite of attributed or instrumental 
value,247 because it is value that is good in itself and has no price.248 
There is a growing awareness, however, that humankind’s special posi-
tion does not warrant arrogance and indifference toward nature in 
general, including non-rational animals that have their own kind of 
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dignity.249 The intrinsic value of all individuals results in two basic pos-
tulates: anti-utilitarian and anti-authoritarian. The former consists of 
the formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative that every individual is 
an end in him- or herself, not a means for collective goals or the pur-
poses of others.250 The latter is synthesized in the idea that the state 
exists for the individual, not the other way around.251 Because it has the 
intrinsic value of every person at its core, human dignity is, in the first 
place, an objective value252 that does not depend on any event or ex-
perience, and thus need not be granted and cannot be lost, even in the 
face of the most reprehensible behavior.253 Consequently, human dig-
nity does not depend on reason itself, as it is present in newborns, the 
senile people, and the incompetent.254 
 As for its legal implications, intrinsic value is the origin of a set of 
fundamental rights.255 The first of these rights is the right to life, a basic 
pre-condition for the enjoyment of any other right.256 Human dignity 
fulfills almost entirely the content of the right to life, leaving space for 
only a few specific controversial situations, such as abortion, assisted 
suicide, and the death penalty.257 A second right directly related to the 
intrinsic value of each and every individual is equality before and under the 
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law.258 All individuals are of equal value and, therefore, deserve equal 
respect and concern.259 This means not being discriminated against 
due to race, color, ethnic or national origin, sex, age, or mental capac-
ity (the right to non-discrimination), as well as respect for cultural, reli-
gious, or linguistic diversity (the right to recognition).260 Human dig-
nity fulfills only part of the content of the idea of equality, and in many 
situations it may be acceptable to differentiate among people. In the 
contemporary world, this is particularly at issue in cases involving af-
firmative action and the rights of religious minorities.261 
 Intrinsic value also leads to another fundamental right, the right to 
integrity, both physical and mental. The right to physical integrity262 in-
cludes the prohibition of torture, slave labor, and degrading treatment 
or punishment.263 Discussions on life imprisonment, interrogation 
techniques, and prison conditions take place within the scope of this 
right.264 Finally, the right to mental integrity,265 which in Europe and 
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many civil law countries comprises the right to personal honor and im-
age, includes the right to privacy.266 The idea of privacy in the United 
States, however, is somewhat unique.267 
 Throughout the world, there is a fair amount of case law involving 
fundamental rights that stem from human dignity as an intrinsic value. 
Regarding the right to life, abortion is permitted in the early stages of 
pregnancy by most democracies in the North Atlantic world, including 
the United States, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and Ger-
many.268 Human dignity, in these countries, is not interpreted to rein-
force the right to life of the fetus against the will of its mother.269 As-
sisted suicide is illegal in most countries, with the exception of Holland, 
Belgium, Colombia, Luxembourg, and just a few others.270 In the 
United States, assisted suicide is permitted in Oregon, Washington, and 
Montana.271 The main concern with respect to assisted suicide is not 
the termination of life by the will of patients who are terminally ill, in 
persistent vegetative states, or under unbearable and insurmountable 
pain, but the fear of abuse of vulnerable people.272 Capital punishment 
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has been banned in Europe and most countries in the world; the Unit-
ed States is a striking exception among democracies.273 Although 
grounded in American historical tradition, it is difficult to argue that 
the death penalty is compatible with respect for human dignity, as it is a 
complete objectification of the individual, whose life and humanity 
succumb to the highly questionable public interest in retribution. 
 As for equality, the practice of affirmative action, for example, has 
been upheld in countries such as the United States,274 Canada,275 and 
Brazil,276 and it is expressly permitted by the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.277 On the 
other hand, the rights of religious minorities suffered a setback, espe-
cially in Europe, where the full Islamic veil is either banned in public278 
or is the subject of serious discussions by various member states.279 In 
such countries, courts and legislators failed to uphold dignitarian con-
cerns involving minority groups’ right to identity by finding this right 
outweighed by alleged public interest concerns relating to security, cul-
tural preservation, and women’s rights.280 With regard to physical integ-
rity—or, using American terminology, cruel and unusual punishment— 
courts and authors repeatedly proclaim torture to be unacceptable.281 
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court held that prison overcrowding 
in the state of California violated the Eighth Amendment.282 The major-
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ity opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, references “dignity,” the “dignity 
of man,” and “human dignity.”283 
 Finally, concerning mental integrity, the typical challenge in the 
contemporary world involves the conflict between the right to privacy 
(as personal honor or image) and freedom of expression, particularly 
for the press.284 Aspects of human dignity are present on both sides— 
dignity as intrinsic value versus dignity as autonomy—and the outcomes 
in such cases are influenced by different cultural perceptions.285 A re-
cent example of this clash of legal cultures occurred when New York 
police officers arrested a French public figure, who was then exposed 
to the press in handcuffs and required to make a “perp walk.”286 Al-
though this is a common practice in the United States, the episode was 
regarded by many as an unnecessary and abusive violation of privacy.287 
2. Autonomy 
 Autonomy is the ethical element of human dignity. It is the foun-
dation of the free will of individuals,288 which entitles them to pursue 
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the ideals of living well and having a good life in their own ways.289 The 
central notion is that of self-determination: An autonomous person es-
tablishes the rules that will govern his or her life.290 We have previously 
discussed the Kantian conception of autonomy, which is the will gov-
erned by the moral law (moral autonomy). We are now concerned with 
personal autonomy, which is value neutral and means the free exercise of 
the will according to one’s own values, interests, and desires.291 Auton-
omy requires the fulfillment of certain conditions, such as reason (the 
mental capacity to make informed decisions), independence (the ab-
sence of coercion, manipulation, and severe want), and choice (the 
actual existence of alternatives).292 Note that in the Kantian moral sys-
tem, autonomy is the will that suffers no heteronomous influence and 
corresponds to the idea of freedom.293 In practical political and social 
life, however, individual will is constrained by the law and by social mo-
res and norms.294 Thus, distinct from moral autonomy, personal auton-
omy, although at the origin of freedom, only corresponds with its core 
content. Freedom has a larger scope that can be limited by legitimate 
external forces.295 Autonomy, however, is the part of freedom that can-
not be suppressed by state or social interference, involving basic per-
sonal decisions, such as choices related to religion, personal relation-
ships, and political beliefs.296 
 Autonomy, thus, is the ability to make personal decisions and 
choices in life based on one’s conception of the good, without undue 
external influences. As for its legal implications, autonomy underlies a 
set of fundamental rights associated with democratic constitutionalism, 
including basic freedoms (private autonomy) and the right of political 
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292 See Waldron, supra note 291, at 307–29. 
293 See Kant, supra note 215, at 52 (“[W]hat, then, can freedom of the will be other 
than autonomy . . . ?”). 
294 See Post, Domains, supra note 288, at 1. 
295 See Raz, supra note 234, at 1. 
296 See id. 
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participation (public autonomy).297 With the rise of the welfare state, 
many countries in the world also consider a fundamental social right to 
minimum living conditions (the existential minimum) in the balancing 
that results in true and effective autonomy.298 We will thus discuss, 
briefly, each of these three ideas: private autonomy, public autonomy, 
and the existential minimum. 
                                                                                                                     
 Private autonomy is the key concept behind individual freedom, 
including that which in the United States is usually protected under the 
label of privacy.299 Therefore, the freedoms of religion, speech, and 
association, as well as of sexual and reproductive rights, are important 
expressions of private autonomy.300 Of course, private autonomy does 
not entail absolute rights.301 It is worth re-emphasizing that autonomy 
exists only at the core of different freedoms and rights; it does not oc-
cupy the entire range. For example, as a result of freedom of move-
ment, a free individual can choose where she is going to establish her 
home, a major personal choice; similarly, she will usually decide where 
to spend her next vacation. If a valid law or regulation, however, pro-
hibits her from visiting a particular country, perhaps North Korea or 
Afghanistan, no one would think, at least in principle, that the restric-
tion is a violation of her human dignity. Finally, there can be clashes 
between the autonomy of different individuals,302 as well as between 
autonomy, on the one hand, and intrinsic value or community value, 
on the other.303 Thus, private autonomy, as an essential element of hu-
man dignity, offers a good standard for defining the content and scope 
of freedom and rights, but does not free legal reasoning from weighing 
complex facts and taking into account apparently contrasting norms in 
order to strike a proper balance under the circumstances. 
 
297 This distinction is the cornerstone of the “reconstructive approach to law” of Jür-
gen Habermas, Germany’s most prominent contemporary philosopher. See Habermas, 
supra note 196, at 84–104. 
298 See International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 
74, art. 11. 
299 See Habermas, supra note 196, at 122–26. 
300 See id. at 125–26. 
301 Indeed, freedom of religion may be limited in the public sphere. See Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878). Freedom of speech may also be regulated when 
the target is commercial speech. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 
(1978). Likewise, freedom to terminate pregnancy may be restricted after a certain point 
in the development of the fetus. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–64 (1973). 
302 An example: the right to consume a legal product, such as cigarettes, versus some-
one else’s right not to become an involuntary secondhand smoker. 
303 As when, for example, the will of the patient to terminate his own life is thwarted by 
the duty of the physician to protect life or by the social/legal perception that this is an 
unacceptable decision. 
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 Private autonomy, as we have seen, stands for individualized self-
government.304 This is what Benjamin Constant called the “liberty of the 
moderns,” based on civil liberties, the rule of the law, and freedom from 
abusive state interference.305 Public autonomy, on the other hand, con-
cerns the “liberty of the ancients,” a republican liberty associated with cit-
izenship and participation in political life.306 Ancient Greeks felt a moral 
obligation toward citizenship and invested substantial time and energy 
in public affairs, which was facilitated by the fact that slaves did most of 
the work.307 As democracy is a partnership in self-government,308 it re-
quires an interrelation between individual citizens and the collective 
will.309 This means that every citizen has the right to participate directly 
or indirectly in government.310 Along these lines, public autonomy en-
tails the right to vote, to run for office, to be a member of political or-
ganizations, to be active in social movements, and, particularly, the right 
and the conditions to participate in public discourse. Ideally, the law to 
which every individual needs to abide would be created with his partici-
pation, assuring him the status of an autonomous citizen, and not a het-
eronomous subject.311 Regarding public autonomy, an important deci-
sion by the ECtHR held that the United Kingdom’s law denying 
prisoners the right to vote was in violation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.312 Although the decision has been strongly ques-
tioned by Members of the British Parliament,313 the ECtHR properly 
established that “prisoners in general continue to enjoy all the funda-
                                                                                                                      
304 Christman & Anderson, supra note 288, at 14 (“Many of the alleged tensions be-
tween liberalism and traditional republican conceptions of justice also turn on the con-
tested meaning of political freedom or liberty and its relationship to an understanding of 
citizen autonomy, especially insofar as that understanding assumes a division (and political 
opposition) between autonomy as individualized self-government and autonomy as collec-
tive, socially instituted self-legislation.”). 
305 See Benjamin Constant, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns, 
in Political Writings 307, 310–11 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1988) (1819). 
306 Id. at 311. 
307 Id. at 314. 
308 Dworkin, supra note173, at 5. 
309 Post, Dignity, supra note 288, at 8. 
310 See id. 
311 Id. at 9. 
312 See Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No. 74025/01, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 849, 
869–70 (2006). 
313 See Molly M. Hofsomme, The UK Defies European Court of Human Rights by Denying All 
Prisoners the Right to Vote, Hum. Rts. Brief (Apr. 23, 2011), http://hrbrief.org/2011/04/ 
the-uk-defies-european-court-of-human-rights-by-denying-all-prisoners-the-right-to-vote. 
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mental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention [includ-
ing the right to vote] save for the right to liberty . . . .”314 
 Finally, attached to the idea of human dignity is the concept of exis-
tential minimum,315 also referred to as social minimum316 or the basic 
right to the provision of adequate living conditions.317 Equality, in a 
substantive sense, and especially autonomy (both private and public), 
are dependent on the fact that individuals are “free[] from want,”318 
meaning that their essential needs are satisfied. To be free, equal, and 
capable of exercising responsible citizenship, individuals must pass 
minimum thresholds of well-being, without which autonomy is a mere 
fiction.319 This requires access to some essential utilities, such as basic 
education and health care services, as well as some elementary necessi-
ties, such as food, water, clothing, and shelter. The existential mini-
mum, therefore, is the core content of social and economic rights, 
whose existence as actual fundamental rights—not mere privileges de-
pendent on the political process—is rather controversial in some coun-
tries.320 Its enforceability is complex and cumbersome everywhere.321 
Notwithstanding these challenges, the concept of minimum social 
rights that can be protected by courts, and that are not entirely de-
pendent on legislative action, has been accepted by case law in several 
countries, including Germany,322 South Africa,323 and Brazil.324 
                                                                                                                      
 
314 See Hirst, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 866. 
315 This is the literal translation of the term used by German authors and courts, Exis-
tenzminimum. See Alexy, supra note 188, at 290 (“[T]here can hardly be any doubt that the 
Federal Constitutional Court presupposes the existence of a constitutional right to an exis-
tential minimum.”). 
316 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 235, at 228–29 (“[A] social minimum 
providing for the basic needs of all citizens is also an essential . . . .”). 
317 Habermas, supra note 196, at 123 (“Basic rights to the provision of living condi-
tions that are socially, technologically, and ecologically safeguarded . . . .”). 
318 In his State of the Union address, now known as the Four Freedoms Speech, given 
on January 6, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed four freedoms that people 
“everywhere in the world” should enjoy, which included freedom of speech, freedom of 
worship, freedom from want and freedom from fear. See Franklin Delano Roosevelt, U.S. Pres-
ident, Message to Congress ( Jan. 6, 1941), available at http://americanrhetoric.com/ 
speeches/PDFFiles/FDR%20-%20Four%20Freedoms.pdf. 
319 See Joel Anderson & Axel Honneth, Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice, in 
Autonomy and The Challenges to Liberalism, supra note 288, at 127–29. 
320 See Alexy, supra note 188, at 284–85. 
321 See id. at 290–92. 
322 See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] June 
21, 1977, 45 BVerfGE 184 (229); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG][Federal Constitu-
tional Court] June 18, 1975, 40 BVerfGE 121 (134–36); Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfG][Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 19, 1951, 1 BVerfGE 97 (104–05); Bundes-
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 In the United States, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt raised 
the issue for the first time in a famous speech325 and subsequently pro-
posed legislation for “The Second Bill of Rights,” presented on January 
11, 1944, with express references to the rights to adequate food, cloth-
ing, a decent home, medical care, and education.326 Although Roose-
velt thought that the implementation of these second generation rights 
was a duty of Congress, but not of the courts, Cass Sunstein convinc-
ingly argues that a string of Supreme Court decisions decided between 
the early 1940s and early 1970s came very close to acknowledging cer-
tain social and economic rights as true constitutional rights.327 Accord-
ing to Sunstein, a counterrevolution occurred after Richard Nixon was 
elected president in 1968, particularly through his appointees to the 
Supreme Court.328 Consequently, the Court’s case law became more 
aligned with the traditional and dominant view in American law that 
fundamental rights do not entitle individuals to positive state action.329 
More recently, the 2010 health reform law reignited this debate.330 My 
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cient water); South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 60–61 para. 20 (involving 
access to adequate housing). 
324 In Brazil, there is case law relating to health care and medicines, S.T.F., STA 
175/CE, Relator: Ministro Presidente, 18.09.2009, 210, Revista Trimestral de Juris-
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persons, S.T.F., ADI 2649/DF, Relator: A Sra. Ministra Cármen Lúcia, 08.05.2008, 207, 
Revista Trimestral de Jurisprudência [R.T.J.], 16.10.2008, 583 (Braz.); and to access to 
education, S.T.F., RE 410715, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, 27.10.2005 (Braz.), available at 
Revista Trimestral de Jurisprudência [R.T.J.]. 
325 See Roosevelt, supra note 318. 
326 See Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President, State of the Union Address to Congress 
( Jan. 11, 1944), available at http://fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/address_text.html (an-
nouncing a plan for a bill of social and economic rights). 
327 See Cass Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution 
and Why We Need It More Than Ever 154–68 (2004) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254 (1970) (holding that the termination of welfare benefits without a hearing violated 
the due process clause); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down a state 
law that imposed a one-year waiting period before a new arrival to the state could apply for 
welfare benefits); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that an indigent 
must be provided with counsel on his first appeal of a criminal conviction); Gideon v. 
Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that states are required to provide defense law-
yers in criminal cases for defendants who cannot afford one); and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that the equal protection clause requires states to provide trial 
transcripts at no cost to poor people appealing their criminal convictions)). 
328 See Sunstein, supra note 327, at 163. 
329 Id. at 165–67. 
330 See, e.g., Lance Gable, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public Health, and 
the Elusive Target of Human Rights, 39 J.L. Med. & Ethics 340, 347–51 (2011) (discussing 
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argument here is that the existential minimum is at the core of human 
dignity, and that autonomy cannot exist where choices are dictated 
solely by personal needs.331 Accordingly, the very poor must be granted 
constitutional protection.332 
3. Community Value 
 The third and final element, human dignity as community value, also 
referred to as dignity as constraint or dignity as heteronomy, relates to the 
social dimension of dignity. The contours of human dignity are shaped 
by the relationship of the individual with others, as well as with the 
world around him.333 Autonomy protects the person from becoming 
merely a gear in the engine of society.334 Despite this, in the words of 
English poet John Donne, “[n]o man is an island, entire of itself.”335 
The term community value, which is quite ambiguous, is used here, by 
convention, to identify two different external forces that act on the indi-
vidual: (1) the “shared beliefs, interests, and commitments”336 of the 
social group and (2) state-imposed norms. The individual, thus, lives 
within himself, within a community, and within a state. His personal au-
tonomy is constrained by the values, rights, and mores of people who 
are just as free and equal as him, as well as by coercive regulation. In an 
insightful book, Robert Post similarly identified three distinct forms of 
social order: community (a “shared world of common faith and fate”), 
management (the instrumental organization of social life through law 
to achieve specific objectives), and democracy (an arrangement that 
embodies the purpose of individual and collective self-determina-
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tion). 
331 Raz, supra note 234, at 155 (“[The agents’] choices must not be dictated by per-
sonal needs.”). 
332 See Dworkin, Democracy, supra note 173, at 8 (“[T]he very poor should be re-
garded, like a minority and disadvantaged race, as a class entitled to special constitutional 
protection.”). 
333 See Post, Domains, supra note 288, at 182. 
334 Id. 
335 See John Donne, XVII. Meditation, in Devotions upon Emergent Occasions 107, 
108–09 (Univ. of Mich. Press 1959) (1624), available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/donne/ 
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336 Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise 
of Community 358 (1992). 
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tion).337 These three forms of social order presuppose and depend on 
each other, but are also in constant tension.338 
 Dignity as a community value, therefore, emphasizes the role of 
the state and community in establishing collective goals and restrictions 
on individual freedoms and rights on behalf of a certain idea of the 
good life.339 The relevant question here is in what circumstances and to 
what degree should these actions be regarded as legitimate in a consti-
tutional democracy? The liberal predicament that the state must be 
neutral with regard to different conceptions of the good in a plural so-
ciety340 is not incompatible, of course, with limitations resulting from 
the necessary coexistence of different views and potentially conflicting 
rights.341 Such interferences, however, must be justified on grounds of a 
legitimate idea of justice, an “overlapping consensus”342 that can be 
shared by most individuals and groups.343 Community value, as a con-
straint on personal autonomy, seeks legitimacy through the pursuit of 
three goals: (1) the protection of the rights and dignity of others, (2) 
the protection of the rights and dignity of oneself, and (3) the protec-
tion of shared social values.344 In their studies on bioethics and biolaw, 
Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword explored in depth this con-
ception of “human dignity as constraint,” centered around the ideas of 
duties and responsibilities, as opposed to “human dignity as empower-
ment,” which is essentially concerned with rights.345 
 It is not difficult to understand and justify the existence of a con-
cept of community value giving content to and shaping the contours of 
human dignity, alongside intrinsic value and autonomy. If the lines are 
properly drawn, its goals are legitimate and desirable. The critical prob-
lem here is the risk involved. Regarding the first goal—protection of 
the rights and dignity of others—any civilized society imposes criminal 
                                                                                                                      
337 See Post, Domains, supra note 288, at 3, 5, 15. 
338 Id. at 2. 
339 Id. at 128. 
340 See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 191 (1985). 
341 See John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 9 
(1987). 
342 “Overlapping consensus” is a term coined by John Rawls that identifies basic ideas 
of justice that can be shared by supporters of different religious, political, and moral com-
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343 See id. at 24. 
344 See Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics 
and Biolaw 29–38, 63–66 (2001); Selznick, supra note 336, at 126. 
345 See Beyleveld & Brownsword, supra note 344, at 29–46, 65; Deryck Beyleveld & 
Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Human Genetics, 61 Mod. L. Rev. 
661, 667 (1998). 
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and civil sanctions to safeguard values and interests relating to life, 
physical and emotional integrity, and property, among others.346 It is 
thus beyond doubt that personal autonomy can be restricted to prevent 
wrongful behavior, be it based on the harm principle developed by 
John Stuart Mill347 or on the broader concept of the offense principle 
defended by Joel Feinberg.348 To be sure, the power to punish can be, 
and often is, employed in an abusive or disproportional way. Its neces-
sity, however, even in the most liberal societies, is not contested.349 On 
the other hand, the additional goals—protection of both individual 
and shared social values—run the severe risk of paternalism350 and 
moralism.351 It is largely recognized that some degree of paternalism is 
acceptable,352 but in order for such interference to be legitimate, its 
boundaries must be established with great restraint. As for moralism, it 
is also acceptable that a democratic society may employ its coercive 
power to enforce some moral values and collective goals.353 Here again, 
however, and for stronger reasons, the boundaries must be tightly 
maintained in order to protect against the grave risk of moral majori-
tarianism, or the tyranny of the majority.354 The legitimacy and limits 
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347 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 21–22 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed. 1978) (1874) 
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associated with protection of “shared morality” are the object of an im-
portant exchange between Patrick Devlin and H.L.A. Hart.355 
 Dignity as community value, often inspired by paternalistic or 
moralistic motivations, underlies judicial decisions throughout the 
world. One of the most famous of such decisions is the holding in the 
“dwarf-tossing” case. The mayor of a town near Paris banned the bar 
spectacle lancer de nain, in which a dwarf, wearing protective gear, was 
thrown short distances by customers. The case reached the Council of 
the State, which held the prohibition to be legitimate, based on defense 
of the public order and protection of human dignity.356 The dwarf op-
posed the ban on all instances and took the case to the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee, which did not find the measure to be abu-
sive.357 A second well-known decision involves the Peep Show Case, hand-
ed down by the German Federal Administrative Court.358 The court 
upheld the denial of a license to conduct an attraction in which a wom-
an performs a striptease for an individual in a small booth.359 With 
payment, the stage would become visible to the patron, but the woman 
could not see him.360 The license was refused on the ground that it vio-
lated good morals because such a performance violated the human 
dignity of the women displayed, who would be degraded to the level of 
an object.361 A third case involved the prosecution of a group of people 
in the United Kingdom accused of assault and wounding during sado-
masochistic encounters.362 Although the activities were consensual and 
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Law] 790 (1996). 
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conducted in private, the House of Lords held that the existence of 
consent was not a satisfactory defense where actual bodily harm oc-
curred.363 The ECtHR found no violation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.364 
 There are several morally and legally controversial issues relating 
to community values. One of them is prostitution. In South Africa, a 
divided Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of a law that 
made “carnal intercourse . . . for reward” a crime.365 The Supreme 
Court of Canada upheld a provision of the Criminal Code that prohib-
ited communications in public for the purpose of prostitution, a dis-
tinct but related issue.366 Both courts have upheld bans on brothels and 
bawdy houses.367 Taking a different perspective, the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia held that prostitution is a tolerated social phe-
nomenon, that prostitutes are a historically discriminated-against group 
deserving of special protection, and that voluntary sex work, under sub-
ordination to and payment from a bar owner, constitutes a de facto labor 
contract.368 Another polemical matter that challenges the proper 
boundaries between dignity as autonomy and dignity as shaped by het-
eronomous forces is the decriminalization of drugs. The Supreme 
Court of Canada discussed the matter extensively in a 2003 divided de-
cision which held that Parliament could validly criminalize the posses-
sion of marijuana and punish offenders with imprisonment.369 A num-
ber of countries have adopted,370 and several world leaders have 
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criminalizing certain drugs. See, e.g., Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes & Alex Stevens, What Can We 
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advocated for, the decriminalization of drugs, particularly so-called 
“light” drugs.371 Another complex and sensitive issue involves hate 
speech. In most democratic countries, speech aimed at the deprecia-
tion of vulnerable groups or individuals, based on ethnicity, race, color, 
religion, gender, or sexual orientation, among other characteristics, is 
not acceptable and is not within the range of protection for freedom of 
expression.372 The United States, in this particular instance, is a solitary 
exception.373 
 The coercive imposition of external values, with the exception of 
the plain exercise of autonomy in the name of a communitarian di-
mension of human dignity, is never trivial. It requires adequate justifica-
tion, which must take into account three elements: (1) the existence of 
a fundamental right that is affected, (2) the potential harm to oneself 
and to others, and (3) the level of societal consensus on the matter.374 
As for the verification of the presence of a fundamental right, it is ap-
propriate to make a distinction between two different views and respec-
tive terminology. Some authors acknowledge the existence of a “gen-
eral right to liberty” (or freedom), along with specific and express 
freedoms, such as freedom of expression, religion, and others.375 The 
general right to liberty means a general freedom of action that can, 
however, be limited by any legal norm that is compatible with the con-
stitution.376 Restrictions on such a general right require only a rational 
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basis and a legitimate state interest or collective goal.377 Other authors, 
particularly Ronald Dworkin, employ a narrower concept of “basic lib-
erties,” as opposed to general liberty, that correspond with “moral 
right[s]” —they are the true, substantive fundamental rights.378 Basic 
freedoms are to be treated as “trumps” against majority rule,379 and 
restrictions on them must pass strict scrutiny.380 Thus, general freedom 
may be broadly limited, but basic freedoms should usually prevail over 
collective goals in all but exceptional circumstances.381 
 The risk of harm to others is usually a reasonable ground to limit 
personal autonomy. It is broadly accepted today that Mill’s formulation 
of the harm principle as the only justification for state interference with 
individual freedom “may well be too simple” and that “multiple crite-
ria” will determine when liberty can be restricted.382 Harm to others, 
however, enjoys a fair presumption as to the legitimacy of the restric-
tion.383 Harm to oneself may also be an acceptable ground for limiting 
personal autonomy, as mentioned before, but in this case the burden of 
demonstrating its legitimacy will usually be on the state, since paternal-
ism should raise suspicion.384 Finally, the limitation of personal auton-
omy on grounds of public morals requires strong societal consensus.385 
The ban on child pornography—even in cases of graphic depiction, 
without an actual child involved—or the prohibition of incest, are seri-
ous candidates for this consensus. In a plural and democratic society, 
however, there will always be moral disagreements. Issues of capital 
punishment, abortion, and same-sex marriage will always be disputed. 
A brief reflection on this subject is called for before closing this Part.386 
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 Even moral realists who believe that moral claims can be true or 
false—a highly contested issue in philosophical debate—acknowledge 
that their belief is not applicable to all moral truths.387 There will always 
be moral disagreement, and thus in many situations no objective moral 
truth.388 Despite their different conceptions, citizens must coexist and 
cooperate, bound together by a framework of basic freedoms and 
rights. The role of the state when interpreting community values is to 
uphold those values that are genuinely shared by the people and to 
avoid, whenever possible, choosing sides in morally divisive disputes.389 
One good reason for this abstention is that allowing one group to im-
pose its moral view over others poses a challenge to the ideal that all 
individuals are equal and free. There are certainly disputed political is-
sues that will have to be settled by the majority, such as choices involv-
ing environmental protection, economic development, the use of nu-
clear energy, or limits on affirmative action. Truly moral issues, however, 
should not be decided by majorities. The majority, for example, has no 
right to say that homosexual sex is a crime, as the Supreme Court held 
in Bowers v. Hardwick.390 Of course, there will be cases in which it is dif-
ficult to draw the line between the political and the truly moral; indeed, 
the two domains often overlap.391 Whenever a significant moral issue 
can be identified, however, the best thing for the state to do is to lay out 
a framework that allows individuals on both sides of the issue to exer-
cise personal autonomy. The battlefield in such cases should remain 
within the realm of ideas and rational persuasion. In the next Part, I 
will apply these ideas to a set of controversial cases. 
III. Using Human Dignity to Structure Legal  
Reasoning in Hard Cases 
A. Abortion 
 The voluntary termination of a pregnancy is a highly controversial 
moral issue throughout the world. In different countries, legislation 
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ranges from total prohibition and criminalization to practically unre-
stricted access to abortion.392 Strikingly, abortion rates in countries 
where the procedure is legal are very similar to the rates in countries 
where it is illegal.393 Indeed, the main difference between countries 
that criminalize abortion and those that decriminalize it is the inci-
dence of unsafe abortion.394 Criminalization also can result in de facto 
discrimination against poor women, who must resort to primitive 
methods of ending pregnancy due to lack of access to either private or 
public medical assistance.395 Starting with Canada in 1969,396 the Unit-
ed States in 1973,397 and France in 1975,398 abortion, usually in the first 
trimester, was broadly removed from criminal codes. Several other 
countries followed this trend, including Austria (1975), New Zealand 
(1977), Italy (1978), the Netherlands (1980), and Belgium (1990).399 
In Germany, a rather ambiguous judicial decision in 1993 led to the 
non-punishment of abortion in the first trimester provided that certain 
conditions are met.400 In fact, almost all countries in the richer North 
Atlantic world decriminalize abortion in the early stages of pregnancy, 
thus rendering the total prohibition of abortion a policy that prevails 
only in the developing world.401 The Catholic Church and many evan-
gelical churches strongly oppose abortion based on the belief that life 
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begins at conception and is inviolable at that point.402 Yet, many who 
personally believe that abortion is morally wrong still favor its decrimi-
nalization for philosophical or pragmatic reasons.403 The next para-
graphs discuss the relationship between abortion and human dignity, 
taking into account intrinsic value, autonomy, and community value, as 
well as the rights and duties associated with each of these elements. 
 At the intrinsic value level, the abortion debate represents a clash 
between fundamental values and rights.404 For those who believe that a 
fetus should be treated as human life beginning at fertilization—and 
this premise must be assumed here for the sake of argument—abortion 
clearly is a violation of the fetus’ right to live. This is the foundation un-
derlying the pro-life movement, supporting its conclusion that abortion 
is morally wrong.405 On the other hand, pregnancy and the right to 
terminate it implicate the physical and mental integrity of the woman, her 
power to control her own body. Moreover, abortion must also be con-
sidered an equal protection issue, because only women bear the full bur-
den of pregnancy and the right to terminate it puts them on a level 
playing field with men.406 Therefore, with regard to human dignity 
viewed as intrinsic value, there is one fundamental right favoring the 
anti-abortion position—the right to life—countered by two fundamen-
tal rights favoring the position of the woman’s right of choice—physical 
and mental integrity, and equal protection of the law.407 
 As for autonomy, we must consider what role self-determination 
plays in the context of abortion.408 Individuals must be free to make 
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basic personal choices regarding their lives.409 Reproductive rights and 
child rearing are certainly among these decisions and choices. The right 
to privacy, as established by U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding 
abortion, is described as “the principle of public toleration of autono-
mous, self-regarding choice.”410 It is within the autonomy of a woman 
and, therefore, at the core of her basic freedoms, to decide for herself 
whether or not to have an abortion. The will of the mother to termi-
nate her pregnancy could be countered by a hypothetical will of the 
fetus to be born. One could speculate then that there would be a clash 
of autonomies between the woman and the fetus. Two objections can 
be made to this line of reasoning. The first objection is that, although 
the intrinsic value of the fetus has been assumed in the previous para-
graph, it might be more difficult to acknowledge its autonomy due to 
the fact that it does not have any degree of self-consciousness. Further, 
even if this argument could be overcome, there remains another argu-
ment. Because the fetus depends on the woman, but not the other way 
around, if the “will” of the fetus prevailed, the woman would be com-
pletely instrumentalized by its project. In other words, if a woman were 
to be forced to keep a fetus she did not want, she would be transformed 
into a means for the satisfaction of someone else’s will, and not treated 
as an end in herself. 
 Finally, at the community value level, it is necessary to determine 
whether autonomy can be curtailed either by values shared by the so-
cial group or state interests imposed by legal norms.411 Abortion is ar-
guably the most divisive moral issue in public life today. As mentioned 
above, most countries in North America and in Europe have decrimi-
nalized early stage abortion.412 On the other hand, most countries in 
Africa (excluding South Africa) and Latin America impose dramatic 
restrictions on abortions at any stage of pregnancy.413 The fact that im-
portant and respectable religious groups oppose abortion on the basis 
of their faith and dogmas does not overcome the objection that such 
arguments do not fall within the realm of public reason.414 Such being 
the case, one cannot find a significant societal consensus on the matter. 
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In fact, the only clearly perceivable conclusion is that abortion is a 
point of major moral disagreement in contemporary society. In such 
circumstances, the proper role for the state is not to take sides and im-
pose one view, but instead to allow individuals to make autonomous 
choices. In other words, the state must value individual autonomy, not 
legal moralism. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Roe v. Wade, the 
state’s interest in protecting prenatal life and the mother’s health does 
not outweigh the fundamental right of a woman to have an abortion.415 
There are two other strong arguments in favor of legalization. The first, 
as statistics show, is the difficulty of enforcing the prohibition.416 The 
second is the discriminatory impact that a ban on abortion has on poor 
women.417 Decriminalization does not preclude those who oppose 
abortion from advocating their views. In fact, many communities in 
countries with legalized abortion treat it as a social taboo and use 
strong social pressure to discourage women from terminating their 
pregnancies.418 
B. Same-Sex Marriage 
 Legal recognition of same-sex marriage is another highly contro-
versial moral issue throughout the world. Notwithstanding this contro-
versy, the evolution of public opinion on the matter is evolving rapidly 
and resistance to change is less effective in comparison to the relatively 
static stalemate on abortion.419 To be sure, discrimination against ho-
mosexual conduct and homosexual partners clearly existed in legal and 
social practices until the beginning of the twenty-first century.420 In the 
United States, for example, prior to the 1970s, the American Psychiatric 
Association categorized homosexuality as a mental disorder.421 In 1971, 
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all but two American states criminalized homosexual sodomy.422 As late 
as 1986, the Supreme Court upheld state laws criminalizing intimate 
homosexual sexual behavior,423 a decision ultimately overruled in 
2003.424 In 1993, a major development occurred when the Supreme 
Court of Hawaii ruled that a statute limiting marriage to opposite-sex 
couples constituted sex discrimination.425 As a reaction to the court’s 
ruling, from 1995 to 2005, forty-three states adopted legislation prohib-
iting same-sex marriage.426 Ironically, this backlash unified the Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender community in favor of same-sex mar-
riage, which was opposed by radical militants who considered it a con-
cession by sexual minorities to conventional rites.427 In 2004, in re-
sponse to a decision by its highest court, Massachusetts became the first 
state to legalize same-sex marriage.428 In recent years, homosexuality 
has increasingly become an accepted lifestyle and there is a growing 
belief that its causes are predominantly biological.429 If this is indeed 
the case, discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation is the same as 
discriminating against Asians for their eyes, Africans for their color, or 
Latin Americans for being the product of miscegenation. 
 In this evolving context, it is no surprise that a number of coun-
tries have legalized same-sex marriage, including Argentina, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Af-
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rica, and Sweden.430 In several other countries, similar legislation has 
been proposed and discussions are underway.431 It is true that some 
countries, including (surprisingly) France, prohibit same-sex mar-
riage.432 In the United States as well, a 1996 federal statute known as 
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defines marriage as “a legal un-
ion between one man and one woman as husband and wife.”433 The 
administration of President Barack Obama, however, announced that it 
will no longer defend the constitutionality of DOMA, which has been 
challenged in several different lawsuits.434 Moreover, several states have 
passed legislation recognizing same-sex marriage, including Connecti-
cut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York, as 
well as the District of Columbia.435 As with abortion, there is fierce reli-
gious opposition to homosexual conduct and same-sex marriage.436 
Based on biblical passages read as condemnations of homosexual con-
duct,437 many evangelical groups have expressed strong disapproval; 
within the Catholic Church, Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI have 
criticized countries for passing legislation protective of homosexual-
ity.438 
 Analyzing same-sex marriage in light of the idea of human dignity 
presented in this Article is much less complicated than analyzing abor-
tion under the same rubric. Indeed, at the intrinsic value level, there is a 
fundamental right in favor of legalizing same-sex marriage: equality un-
der the law.439 To deny same-sex couples access to marriage— and all the 
social and legal consequences that it entails—represents a form of dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation. There is no other argument 
stemming from intrinsic value that could reasonably be employed to 
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counter the right of equal protection and respect to which homosexu-
als are entitled. As for autonomy, same-sex marriage involves two con-
senting adults who choose, without coercion or manipulation, how to 
exercise their affection and sexuality.440 There is neither violation of 
another’s autonomy nor harm to another that could justify a prohibi-
tion. Finally, at the level of community value, one must acknowledge that 
numerous segments of civil society, particularly religious groups, disap-
prove of homosexual behavior and same-sex marriage.441 To deny the 
right of same-sex couples to get married, however, would be an unwar-
ranted restriction of their autonomy on behalf of either improper mor-
alism or the tyranny of the majority. First, there is a fundamental right 
involved, whether it is the right to equality or to privacy (freedom of 
choice). Even if this were not the case, the undeniable fact is that no 
risk of harm to third parties or to oneself is presented here. Finally, one 
can no longer find a strong level of societal consensus against same-sex 
marriage in a world where, at least in most Western societies, homo-
sexuality is largely accepted.442 Of course, anyone has the right to advo-
cate against same-sex marriage and to try to convince people to abstain 
from participation.443 This is different, however, than asking the state 
not to recognize a legitimate exercise of personal autonomy by free and 
equal citizens. 
C. Assisted Suicide 
 Assisted suicide is the act by which an individual brings about his 
or her own death with the assistance of someone else.444 As a general 
rule, the debate on this matter involves physician-assisted suicide, which 
occurs when a doctor provides the necessary information and means, 
such as drugs or equipment, but the patient performs the act.445 Dis-
cussion of assisted suicide usually assumes—as will be assumed here— 
that the relevant individuals are terminally ill and enduring great pain 
and suffering.446 There is strong opposition to assisted suicide by most 
religions, particularly the Catholic Church, which considers suicide to 
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be morally wrong.447 Although the typical conflict between secular hu-
manists and religious believers is also present here, there are some sub-
tleties that provide unusual nuance to this debate. For one, the Hippo-
cratic Oath, still taken by doctors in many countries, directly addresses 
the matter by stating unambiguously: “I will not give a lethal drug to 
anyone if I am asked, nor will I advise such a plan . . . .”448 Furthermore, 
there is always the concern that pressure from family or health plans 
could compromise the free and informed consent of the patient.449 
Thus, unlike abortion and same-sex marriage (or some recognized 
form of same-sex partnership) which are allowed in most developed 
countries, physician-assisted suicide is still generally illegal.450 In Eu-
rope, as mentioned earlier, the ECtHR decided in Pretty v. United King-
dom that there is no fundamental right to assisted suicide.451 
 The Supreme Court of Canada adopted the same outcome when it 
declared Section 241(b) of the Criminal Code, which criminalized the 
assistance of suicide, constitutional.452 In a 5-to-4 decision, the court 
held: (1) the state interest in protecting life and the vulnerable should 
prevail over claims of personal autonomy, physical and psychological 
integrity, and human dignity; (2) the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause did not apply; and (3) the prohibition of assisted suicide, even if 
an infringement of equality rights, was justified by substantial legislative 
objective and met the proportionality test.453 In addition, the majority 
asserted that it was the role of Parliament—and not of the court—to 
deal with the question of assisted suicide.454 The dissenting justices 
strongly argued that forcing an incapacitated terminally ill patient to 
have a “dreadful, painful death” was “an affront to human dignity” and, 
further, that there was no difference between refusing treatment and 
assisted suicide,455 that there was an infringement of the right to equal-
ity in preventing persons physically unable to end their lives,456 and that 
                                                                                                                      
447 See Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 26 (2002). 
448 For an English translation by Michael North of the National Library of Medicine, 
see The Hippocratic Oath, U.S. Nat’l Library of Med.: Nat’l Insts. of Health, http:// 
www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html (last visited May 15, 2012). 
449 See Pretty, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 17. 
450 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 774–75. 
451 See Pretty, 35 Eur. H.R. rep. at 41. 
452 Rodriguez v. British Columbia, (A.G.) [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, 521–22 (Can.). 
453 See id. at 522–23. 
454 See id. at 523. 
455 See id. at 526 (Cory, J., dissenting). 
456 See id. at 524–25 (Lamer, C.J., dissenting). 
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fear of abuse was not sufficient to override the appellant’s entitlement 
to end her life.457 
 A handful of countries legalize physician-assisted suicide, including 
Belgium, Colombia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.458 
In the United States, where the Supreme Court upheld state bans on 
physician-assisted suicide,459 three states legalized assisted suicide for 
people who have a very limited amount of time to live. Oregon’s Death 
with Dignity Act requires the diagnosis of a terminal illness that will, 
“within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six 
months.”460 The Washington Death with Dignity Act, enacted in 2009, 
mirrors this language by requiring a diagnosis of an illness that will 
“within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six 
months.”461 The most recent state to adopt an assisted suicide regime is 
Montana, which acted through its state supreme court to find immunity 
from prosecution for doctors who assisted in the deaths of terminally ill 
patients.462 The state legislature, however, declined to pass a bill that 
fully describes the limits of any right to die and instead left the issue in 
“legal limbo.”463 The rules of these American states are stricter than 
those of other countries. In the Netherlands, for example, the standard 
is more relaxed, and people facing the prospect of “unbearable suffer-
ing with no prospect of improvement” may perform assisted suicide, 
regardless of the exact time of diagnosis.464 Similarly, under Belgian 
law, patients suffering from “constant and unbearable physical or psy-
chological pain resulting from an accident or incurable illness” are le-
gally allowed to request assisted suicide from their physicians.465 
                                                                                                                      
457 See id. at 523 (L’Hereux & McLachlin, JJ., dissenting). 
458 Andrew Clark, Will Massachusetts Legalize Physician-Assisted Suicide?, Atlantic, Dec. 1, 
2011, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/12/will-massachusetts- 
legalize-physician-assisted-suicide/249346/ (“There are currently six nations that permit 
physician-assisted suicide: Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Albania, Colombia, and 
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459 See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 797; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705–06. 
460 See Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800 (2008). 
461 See Wash. Rev. Code § 70.245.010 (2009). 
462 See Kirk Johnson, Ruling by Montana Supreme Court Bolsters Physician-Assisted Suicide, 
N.Y. Times, Jan 1, 2010, at A17. 
463 See Montana Lawmakers Put Physician-Assisted Suicide Issue on Hold, Billings Gazette, 
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464 Ian Ireland, The Netherlands Euthanasia Legislation, Parliament Austl. (May 21, 
2001), http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2000–01/01rn31.htm. 
465 Belgium Legalizes Euthanasia, BBC News (May 16, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/europe/1992018.stm (internal quotations omitted). 
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 Finally, it is necessary to examine the relationship between assisted 
suicide and each of the components of the concept of human dignity 
described in this Article.466 As for intrinsic value, the fundamental right 
to life would naturally be an obstacle to legalizing assisted suicide.467 It is 
difficult to find a right to die that could be invoked to counter the right 
to life. Death is inevitable and not a choice. There certainly is a right to 
physical and mental integrity, however, which is also associated with the 
inherent value of every human being. The fact is that contemporary 
medical technology has the capacity to transform the process of dying 
into a journey that can last longer than would otherwise occur and be 
more painful than necessary.468 Each individual, thus, should have the 
right to die with dignity, and should not be compelled to suffer for an 
extended period of time without the ability to function normally. In a 
rather paradoxical way, at the level of intrinsic value, the right to life 
and the right to integrity can oppose each other. 
 Preserving autonomy is one of the “integral values” in the debate 
over physician-assisted suicide, along with alleviating suffering and 
maintaining community.469 Autonomy generally supports the idea that 
a competent person has the right to choose to die, under certain cir-
cumstances, if after thoughtful reflection she finds that “unrelieved suf-
fering outweighs the value of continued life.”470 In addition, provided 
the physician agrees to do the procedure, no one else’s autonomy is in 
question. Community value, however, is the most complex discussion in 
this analysis.471 To be clear, I do not think the community and state 
should have the right to impose their moralist or paternalist concep-
tions on someone who is hopelessly suffering and close to the end of 
life. They do, however, have the authority and the duty to establish 
some safeguards in order to make sure that each patient’s autonomy is 
properly exercised. In fact, there is a real risk that legalization of as-
sisted suicide could put pressure on the elderly and those with terminal 
illness to choose death in order to reduce the burden on their families. 
In such scenarios, instead of the choice to die being an embodiment of 
                                                                                                                      
466 Since I do not think equal protection plays a role in this scenario, it will not be ad-
dressed here. 
467 Cf. discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
468 See generally DeWitt C. Baldwin, Jr., The Role of the Physician in End of Life Care: What 
More Can We Do?, 2 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 258 (1999) (discussing use of advanced 
medical technologies during end-of-life care and their impact on patients). 
469 See Peter Rogatz, The Positive Virtues of Physician-Assisted Suicide, Humanist, Nov./Dec. 
2001, at 31, 31; cf. discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
470 See Rogatz, supra note 469, at 31. 
471 Cf. discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
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autonomy, it becomes a product of the coercion of vulnerable and 
marginalized individuals, reducing the value of their lives and dig-
nity.472 For these reasons, individuals who are terminally ill and endur-
ing great suffering, as well as those who are in persistent vegetative 
states,473 should have the right to assisted suicide, but legislation must 
be cautiously crafted to ensure that the morally acceptable idea of dy-
ing with dignity does not become a “recipe for elder abuse.”474 These 
pertinent concerns regarding the protection of vulnerable people, 
however, do not affect the central idea defended here: When two fun-
damental rights of the same individual are in conflict, it is reasonable 
and desirable for the state to value personal autonomy.475 The bottom 
line is that the state should respect a person’s choices when it is her 
own tragedy that is at stake.476 
Conclusion 
The One and the Many 
 Early Greek philosophy centered on the quest for an ultimate 
principle—a common substratum to all things and a unity underlying 
diversity.477 This problem is known as “the One and the Many.”478 If 
such a concept were to be applied to democratic societies, human dig-
nity would be a leading candidate for the greatest principle that is in 
the essence of all things. It is true, however, that historical and cultural 
circumstances in distinct parts of the world decisively affect the mean-
ing and scope of human dignity. Intuitively, an idea that varies with pol-
                                                                                                                      
472 The same concerns are present in Nussbaum, Human Dignity, supra note 249, at 
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itics and geography is too elusive to become a workable domestic and 
transnational legal concept. The ambitious and risky purpose of this 
Article is to identify the legal nature of the idea of human dignity and 
to give it a minimum content, from which predictable legal conse-
quences can be deduced, applicable throughout the world. It is an ef-
fort to find common ground and, at the very least, common terminol-
ogy. With that in mind, human dignity is characterized as a fundamental 
value that is at the foundation of human rights, as well as a legal principle 
that (1) provides part of the core meaning of fundamental rights and 
(2) functions as an interpretive principle, particularly when there are 
gaps, ambiguities, and clashes among rights—or among rights and col-
lective goals—as well as moral disagreements. To be sure, the principle 
of human dignity, as elaborated here, attempts to supply a roadmap to 
structure legal reasoning in hard cases, but it does not, of course, solve 
or suppress moral disagreements. That is an impossible task. 
 After establishing that human dignity should be regarded as a legal 
principle—and not as a freestanding fundamental right—I propose 
three elements as its minimum content and derive a set of rights and 
implications from each. For legal purposes, human dignity can be di-
vided into three components: intrinsic value, which identifies the special 
status of human beings in the world; autonomy, which expresses the 
right of every person, as a moral being and as a free and equal individ-
ual, to make decisions and pursue his own idea of the good life; and 
community value, conventionally defined as the legitimate state and so-
cial interference in the determination of the boundaries of personal 
autonomy. This communitarian dimension of human dignity must be 
under permanent and close scrutiny due to the risks of paternalism 
and moralism affecting legitimate personal choices and rights. In struc-
turing legal reasoning in more complex, divisive cases, it is useful to 
identify and discuss the relevant questions that arise in each of the 
three levels of analysis, and therefore provide more transparency and 
accountability to the justification and choices made by courts or other 
interpreters. 
Equals, Nobles, and Gods 
 As we have seen, dignity, in a line of development stretching far 
back in time, was a concept associated with rank: the personal status of 
certain political or social positions. Dignity, thus, was tied up with hon-
or and entitled some individuals to special treatment and privileges. In 
this sense, dignity presupposed a hierarchical society and denoted no-
bility, aristocracy, and the superior condition of some persons over oth-
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ers. Over the centuries, however, with the impulse of religion, philoso-
phy, and sound politics, a different idea of dignity developed—human 
dignity—which protects the equal intrinsic worth of all human beings 
and the special place of humanity in the universe. Such is the concept 
explored in this Article; a concept that is at the foundation of human 
rights, particularly the rights of freedom and equal protection. These 
ideas are now consolidated in constitutional democracies, and some 
higher aspirations have been cultivated. In a time to come, with a few 
drops of idealism and political determination, human dignity may be-
come the source of a high rank and distinction that is accorded to eve-
ryone: the maximum attainable level of rights, respect, and personal 
achievement. All persons will be nobles.479 Or, better yet, as in the lyrics 
of Les Miserables, “[e]v’ry man will be a king.”480 And, some time in the 
future, given that desire and ambition are unlimited, men will seek to 
become Gods.481 
 
479 This idea is defended in Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights: The 2009 Tanner 
Lectures at UC Berkley 28–29, 30 (N.Y. Univ. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Se-
ries, Working Paper No. 09–50, 2009) (crediting Gregory Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in 
Theories of Rights, supra note 379, at 41, for the idea). 
480 See Alain Boublil and Herbert Kretzmer, One Day More: 
One day to a new beginning 
Raise the flag of freedom high! 
Every man will be a king 
Every man will be a king 
There’s a new world for the winning 
There’s a new world to be won 
Do you hear the people sing? 
Les Misérables (TriStar Pictures 1998). 
481 See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness 566 (Hazel E. Barnes, trans., 
1956) (“[T]he best way to conceive of the fundamental project of human reality is to say 
that man is the being whose project is to be God.”); Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism as 
Humanism 56 (Philip Mairet trans., 1973); see also Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The 
Self Awakened: Pragmatism Unbound 256 (2007). For Unger, the divinization project is 
impossible, but there are ways by which “we can become more godlike.” 
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